$=€=Bitcoin? by Allen, Hilary J.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 4 Article 2
$=€=Bitcoin?
Hilary J. Allen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
76 Md. L. Rev. 877 (2017)
  
877 
Article 
 
$=€=BITCOIN? 
HILARY J. ALLEN 
 Bitcoin (and other virtual currencies) have the potential to rev-
olutionize the way that payments are processed, but only if they 
become ubiquitous.  This Article argues that if virtual currencies 
are used at that scale, it would pose threats to the stability of the 
financial system—threats that have been largely unexplored to 
date.  Such threats will arise because the ability of a virtual cur-
rency to function as money is very fragile—Bitcoin can remain 
money only for so long as people have confidence that bitcoins 
will be readily accepted by others as a means of payment.  Unlike 
the U.S. dollar, which is backed by both a national government 
and a central bank, and the euro, which is at least backed by a 
central bank, there is no institution that can shore up confidence 
in Bitcoin (or any other virtual currency) in the event of a panic. 
 This Article explores some regulatory measures that could help 
address the systemic risks posed by virtual currencies, but argues 
that the best way to contain those risks is for regulated institu-
tions to out-compete virtual currencies by offering better payment 
services, thus consigning virtual currencies to a niche role in the 
economy.  This Article therefore concludes by exploring how the 
distributed ledger technology pioneered by Bitcoin could be 
adapted to allow regulated entities to provide vastly more effi-
cient payment services for sovereign currency-denominated 
transactions, while at the same time seeking to avoid concentrat-
ing the provision of those payment services within “too big to 
fail” banks. 
                                                          
© 2017 Hilary J. Allen. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I view Bitcoin as a potentially promising payment system, saddled 
with a less-than-ideal money and monetary policy.1 
Two broad narratives have emerged from the heated debate about the 
virtual currency Bitcoin.  The first, negative narrative focuses on Bitcoin’s 
potential to facilitate anonymous, nefarious, and fraudulent transactions in a 
realm beyond the power of law enforcement.2  The other, overwhelmingly 
positive narrative posits that Bitcoin will revolutionize money in the same 
way that the internet revolutionized information.3  Proponents of this sec-
                                                          
 1.  David Andolfatto, Fedcoin: On the Desirability of a Government Cryptocurrency, 
MACROMANIA (Feb. 3, 2015, 11:38 AM), http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/02/fedcoin-on-
desirability-of-government.html. 
 2.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 3.  Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: Hearing 
Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) 
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ond narrative stress Bitcoin’s ability to effect payments quickly and reduce 
transaction costs—and, to the extent that it limits the role of national gov-
ernments and central banks in the money supply, Bitcoin is the stuff of lib-
ertarian dreams.4  Each of these narratives contains elements of truth and 
hyperbole, but there is one important element that is largely missing from 
both narratives: the externalities that can be created by virtual currencies.  
The negative narrative focuses only on the counterparties to Bitcoin transac-
tions and misses the threat that a widely used virtual currency could pose to 
the stability of the financial system as a whole (and to the economy more 
broadly).  The positive narrative misses the point that a virtual currency can 
only be transformative if it is widely adopted, and a widely adopted virtual 
currency can threaten the financial system. 
This Article will therefore consider the risks that a widely used virtual 
currency might pose for financial stability.  Perhaps because Bitcoin did not 
come into being until after the financial crisis of 2007–2008 (the “Financial 
Crisis”), it has rarely been mentioned in the large literature on financial sta-
bility that has been penned since the Crisis.  And it is true that, at its current 
size, Bitcoin poses little risk to the financial system.  Since its inception in 
2009, there have been approximately 200 million Bitcoin transactions in to-
tal,5 whereas “[i]n 2012 [alone], there were approximately 122.4 billion 
noncash payments (excluding wire transfers) made in the United States with 
a value of $174.4 trillion.”6  The usage of Bitcoin is steadily increasing, 
however,7 and one important lesson from the Financial Crisis is that risks to 
financial stability can come from unexpected places.  If Bitcoin, or any oth-
er virtual currency, were to become widely used (and to become truly trans-
formative, it would need to be widely used), it could pose a threat to finan-
cial stability in a way that transactions consummated in United States 
dollars (“USD”) do not. 
                                                          
(written testimony of Patrick Murck, General Counsel, The Bitcoin Foundation).  Patrick Murck 
explained:  
Bitcoin is a protocol.  It is like TCP/IP, which enables all the different uses people 
around the globe invented for the Internet.  And it is like HTML, which enables all the 
different uses people invented for the World Wide Web without having to ask anyone’s 
permission.  We envision Bitcoin as a driver of global change that rivals these other 
protocols in terms of the benefits it delivers to humankind across the globe. 
Id. 
 4.  Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2014, 11:54 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters/?_r=0. 
 5.  Total Number of Transactions, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/charts/n-
transactions-total (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 6.  U.S. FED. RES. SYS., STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE U.S. PAYMENT SYSTEM 6 (2015) 
[hereinafter, PAYMENTS WHITE PAPER] (citing FEDERAL RES. SYS., THE 2013 FEDERAL RESERVE 
PAYMENTS STUDY (2013)). 
 7.  Total Number of Transactions, supra note 5. 
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The USD is currently the preeminent world currency.  Backed by the 
full faith and credit of the United States government, its supply is managed 
by members of the Federal Reserve System to meet worldwide demand.8  
The support of the U.S. government and central bank inspires unparalleled 
confidence in the USD as a reliable store of value and a widely accepted 
means of exchange.9  There is, for the foreseeable future at least, no risk 
that the USD will cease to become accepted as a method of effecting pay-
ments, or that significant exposures to the USD will cripple financial insti-
tutions. 
The euro is a much newer currency that could theoretically pose some 
risk to the financial system.  This is because of the euro’s unique status as a 
supranational currency with centralized monetary policy (administered by 
the European Central Bank or “ECB”), but decentralized fiscal policy (the 
national governments of the European countries that use the euro as their 
currency have retained much of their unilateral authority to make decisions 
about taxing and spending).10  When it was launched in 1999, the architects 
of the euro hoped that it would serve as a counterbalance to the dominance 
of the USD and, for much of the 2000s, the euro seemed to be fulfilling that 
promise.11  However, the fallout from the Financial Crisis spurred a sover-
eign debt crisis in Europe that has damaged the fiscal health of some of the 
countries that use the euro—particularly Greece.12  Greece’s dire fiscal situ-
ation could ultimately force it to abandon the euro and redenominate its ob-
ligations in a new currency, a possibility that has, to some degree, compro-
mised the status of the euro as readily accepted money.13  Should Greece 
actually redenominate its obligations, faith in the euro will be put to the 
test, cross-border payment systems in Europe may be affected, and financial 
                                                          
 8.  See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 9.  Adam Davidson, In Greenbacks We Trust, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/magazine/in-greenbacks-we-trust.html.  Adam Davidson 
explained that, notwithstanding the Financial Crisis:  
[T]he dollar itself never faltered.  Confidence in currencies is measured in various 
ways—by inflation, by the interest rate governments have to pay to borrow, by the ex-
change rate with other currencies and so on.  For years now, the dollar has performed 
better than at almost any point in history on all of these measures.  Seven years after a 
U.S. financial crisis nearly brought down the world economy, confidence in the dollar 
has never been stronger. 
Id. 
 10.  See generally Alex Cukierman, Monetary Policy and Institutions Before, During and Af-
ter the Global Financial Crisis, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 373, 382 (2013). 
 11.  See CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, AND 
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (2014). 
 12.  See infra text accompanying notes 107–109. 
 13.  See infra text accompanying notes 107–109. 
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institutions with exposure to certain euro-denominated obligations may suf-
fer.14 
In the sense that the euro lacks the backing of a single sovereign gov-
ernment, we can think of it as a movement along the spectrum away from 
traditional sovereign currencies, like the USD, which have institutional 
backing from both the government and a central bank.  At the other end of 
that spectrum is privately issued money, which is backed by neither a gov-
ernment nor a central bank.  While privately issued money may be readily 
accepted for a period of time, historically, such privately issued money has 
been much more susceptible to panics than traditional sovereign curren-
cies.15 
Virtual currencies like Bitcoin are a type of privately issued money.  
Although there are many who argue that virtual currencies—like the inter-
net before them—are an unprecedented game-changer that will succeed 
where other types of privately issued money have failed,16 virtual currencies 
are at least as susceptible to panics as previous iterations of privately issued 
money.  Virtual currencies are inherently fragile because they are nothing 
more than a series of numbers recorded on a database, and have no worth as 
an asset class other than their ability to facilitate transactions.17  They are 
not backed by a sovereign, or a commodity, or any other type of payment 
stream that could be of value if the virtual currency ceased to be accepted as 
a means of exchange.  Instead, virtual currencies have value only because 
people believe that others will be willing to accept the virtual currency in 
exchange for other goods and services. 
If, however, something were to happen to damage that belief, a vicious 
cycle of panic would commence: past experience with exchange rate crises 
is illuminating here.18  If people fear that payments can no longer be relia-
bly effected using a virtual currency, demand for it will decrease, and its 
value will plummet as holders try to exchange it for more reliable sovereign 
currencies.  The fear of being left with worthless virtual currency will in-
spire people to try and exchange it as soon as possible, notwithstanding that 
this sub-optimally pushes down the value of the virtual currency for every-
one.  Such decrease in value will confirm fears about the unreliability of the 
virtual currency as a method of payment, causing it to have even less value 
                                                          
 14.  See infra text accompanying note 135. 
 15.  Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 96 
(2011) (“[F]inancial history illustrates the problems that can arise from entrusting [money’s] crea-
tion and destruction to private actors.”). 
 16.  See, e.g., Murck, supra note 3, at 5. 
 17.  Paul Krugman, Opinion, Bits and Barbarism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/opinion/krugman-bits-and-barbarism.html. 
 18.  For a discussion of how the Mexican “Tequila Crisis” led to a financial crisis, see 
Frederic S. Mishkin, Lessons from the Tequila Crisis, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 1521, 1522 (1999). 
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and causing even more people to attempt to dump their virtual currency 
holdings.  If the virtual currency had been used widely as a payment system 
before such a panic, the failure of that virtual currency would dramatically 
impact the normal flow of funds, impeding everyday purchases and other 
transactions.  Financial institutions that held significant amounts of the vir-
tual currency would find themselves facing illiquidity or even insolvency, 
rendering them unable to provide the capital intermediation and risk man-
agement services necessary for economic growth.19 
Such a downward spiral is simply not conceivable with respect to 
payments effected in USD, and it is this inferiority of privately issued mon-
ey that has kept the USD from being supplanted—not, as some have ar-
gued, because laws give the USD an undeserved monopoly.20  In fact, the 
law is very limited in its ability to stop people from using something other 
than a sovereign currency as money if they so desire21—and because the 
law is so limited in its ability to stop the usage of virtual currencies, it is al-
so limited in its ability to regulate the risks that virtual currencies pose to 
the financial system.22  Although this Article will explore some strategies 
for regulating virtual currencies to address such systemic risks, the best way 
to contain such risks is for the traditional financial system to improve the 
ways in which it effects payments in sovereign currencies, relegating virtual 
currencies to a niche role by outcompeting them. 
To this end, there is some truly innovative technology associated with 
virtual currencies that the traditional financial system could take advantage 
of and build upon.23  The most innovative aspect of the Bitcoin system is its 
development of the “blockchain” or “distributed ledger,” which is a large 
decentralized database that has unique identifiers for each user and each 
bitcoin.24  Every transaction that has ever been effected with a bitcoin has 
been recorded on the blockchain, after being verified to ensure that the user 
indeed owned the bitcoin and had not previously tried to spend it.25  Be-
cause all transactions are recorded on the one distributed ledger, this avoids 
                                                          
 19.  See infra Part III.A. 
 20.  See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, Toward Free Market Money, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1977, 
at 12.  
 21.  See text accompanying infra notes 145–153. 
 22.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 23.  See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 819–23 (2015).  
While there has been significant interest in using the distributed ledger to convey property (such 
as securities), this intriguing prospect is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses squarely 
on more traditional notions of payment systems.  Id.  For a discussion of other potential applica-
tions of blockchain technology, see generally Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentral-
ized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580664. 
 24.  Wright & De Filippi, supra note 23, at 2.  
 25.  Id. at 6–8. 
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replication errors and allows quicker verification than if all transactions 
were queued on separately administered ledgers that needed to be recon-
ciled before the transaction could be finalized.26  Because the use of a dis-
tributed ledger can make payments processing cheaper and more efficient, 
this Article will explore the possibilities for a distributed ledger to be used 
within the regulated financial industry (using entries denominated in sover-
eign currency rather than a virtual currency).  Importantly, though, this dis-
tributed ledger needs to be accessible to all regulated financial institu-
tions—it should not concentrate payments processing in the hands of those 
financial institutions that are “too big to fail.”  
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows.  Part I will pro-
vide a brief introduction to the USD, the euro, and Bitcoin, which will facil-
itate the rest of this Article’s discussion.  Part II will look at what “curren-
cy” and “money” are, and conclude that while the USD and the euro 
constitute both currency and money, Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are 
not “currency,” but may functionally achieve the status of money—at least 
for a while—if they are adopted widely enough.  However, as with other 
privately issued money lacking governmental and central bank support, this 
“money” status is fragile, and this fragility opens up the systemic risks that 
are explored in Part III.  Part III also explores the benefits of virtual curren-
cies, particularly the payment system technology innovations associated 
with them.  These technological innovations need not be tied to the virtual 
currencies themselves: by applying these innovations to sovereign curren-
cies, the architecture of antiquated payment systems can be improved with-
out making the financial system more vulnerable (that is, so long as such 
payments innovations are not monopolized by “too big to fail” banks).  Part 
IV therefore considers policies to encourage payments innovation by regu-
lated financial institutions (particularly smaller financial institutions), as a 
complement to regulation designed to mitigate any systemic risks posed by 
virtual currencies.  Part V concludes. 
Before proceeding any further, it is helpful to introduce some of the 
terminology that will be used in this Article.  “Bitcoin” with a capital “B” is 
a reference to the entire Bitcoin network, rather than the individual units of 
currency, which are referred to as bitcoins (lower case “b”).27  This Article 
will be very specific—references to “Bitcoin” or “bitcoins” refer only to 
that particular decentralized cryptocurrency, and the term will not be used 
as a catch-all for virtual currencies more generally.  This Article will also 
                                                          
 26.  TIM SWANSON, CONSENSUS-AS-A-SERVICE: A BRIEF REPORT ON THE EMERGENCE OF 
PERMISSIONED, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER SYSTEMS 1, 24, 28 (2015), http://www.ofnumbers 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf. 
 27.  Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/vocabulary (last 
visited May 17, 2017).  
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rely on several definitions formulated by the international Financial Action 
Task Force in June 2014.  As defined by the Financial Action Task Force, a 
“virtual currency” is a “digital representation of value” that can be distin-
guished from sovereign currencies like the USD or the euro because “[i]t is 
not issued nor guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfills [its] functions on-
ly by agreement within the community of users of the virtual currency.”28  
A specific subset of virtual currency is known as a “cryptocurrency”: “a 
math-based, decentralised convertible virtual currency that is protected by 
cryptography.”29  In this context, the term “decentralized” describes virtual 
currencies that are “distributed, open-source, math-based peer-to-peer virtu-
al currencies that have no central administrating authority, and no central 
monitoring or oversight”30 and the term “convertible” means that the virtual 
currency is convertible into sovereign currency.31  The Bitcoin system is the 
most prominent of the decentralized cryptocurrencies and will be explained 
more fully in Part I. 
I.  THE CAST OF CHARACTERS 
This Part will start with the USD, the oldest of three instruments that 
will be considered in this Article.  The USD was first issued by the Conti-
nental Congress in 1775, and the first 150 years of its existence were tumul-
tuous.32  However, since the end of the Second World War, the USD has 
been the world’s preeminent currency in the sense that it is the most widely 
held reserve currency,33 and it is also frequently used to settle cross-border 
transactions.34  This preeminence generates significant network externalities 
for the USD: its widespread acceptability ensures liquidity and low transac-
tion costs, making the currency even more desirable as a way of effecting 
transactions, shoring up its preeminence in a virtuous cycle.35  Since 1971, 
                                                          
 28.  FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND 
POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS 4 (2014) (footnote omitted). 
 29.  Id. at 5. 
 30.  Id. (footnote omitted).  “Distributed” mean that transactions are verified by a network of 
participants.  Id. at 14 n.13.  
 31.  Id. at 4.  
 32.  For background on the history of the dollar, see generally Arthur Nussbaum, The Law of 
the Dollar, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1937). 
 33.  Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve’s Use of International Swap Lines, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 
603, 612 n.46 (2013) (“Reserve currencies are financial assets international central banks hold in 
reserve because they are considered to be safe and liquid holdings.”).  
 34.  Id. at 612. 
 35.  CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43339, BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS 
AND ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2015).  
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the USD has been a purely fiat currency,36 meaning that it is backed only by 
the full faith and credit of the United States government and is not redeem-
able for any commodity,37 and the supply of USD has been managed by the 
Federal Reserve System since that central banking system was created by 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.38 
The euro is a much newer currency.  Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Por-
tugal, and Greece all adopted euro-denominated banknotes and coins as 
their physical currency on January 1, 2002,39 and a number of other Euro-
pean nations have joined the Eurozone since that time, including Cyprus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia.40  Conspicuously absent 
from this list are Denmark and the United Kingdom, which (notwithstand-
ing their membership in the European Union) have opted to keep their ex-
isting currencies rather than converting to the euro.41  The truly novel thing 
about the euro is that it is the first sovereign currency to exist without “a 
single fiscal authority and political power at the center of a political un-
ion.”42  Monetary policy for the euro is managed by the supranational ECB 
(just as the Federal Reserve manages monetary policy in the United States), 
but fiscal policymaking largely remains with the national governments of 
the countries in the Eurozone.43 
Bitcoin is newer still.  It first appeared in 2009, created by an elusive 
computer programmer who went by the name of Satoshi Nakomoto (the 
                                                          
 36.  See Gold & Silver, FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND, https://www.richmondfed.org 
/faqs/gold_silver (last visited May 17, 2017).  Nixon terminated the gold standard in 1971, moving 
the USD to a purely fiat currency.  Id. 
 37.  EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 1, 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter 
ECB 2012].  This report states:  
Modern economies are typically based on “fiat” money, which is similar to commodity-
backed money in its appearance, but radically different in concept, as it can no longer 
be redeemed for a commodity.  Fiat money is any legal tender designated and issued by 
a central authority.  People are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services 
simply because they trust this central authority.  Trust is therefore a crucial element of 
any fiat money system. 
Id.  
 38.  Federal Reserve Act, Pub L. No. 63-42, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 221–522 (2012)).  
 39.  The History of the Euro, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/ 
index_en.htm (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 40.  What is the Euro Area?, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/euro-area/what-euro-area_en (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Kathleen McNamara, Banking on Legitimacy: The ECB and the Eurozone Crisis, 13 
GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 143, 146 (2012).   
 43.  Rosa M. Lastra, Evolution of the European Central Bank, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1260, 
1266–68 (2012). 
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true identity of Nakomoto has not yet been established).44  It was by no 
means the first of the virtual currencies, but has become the most promi-
nent.45  More specifically, Bitcoin falls into a subgenre of virtual currencies 
known as “cryptocurrencies,” which operate peer-to-peer without any need 
for an intermediary institution to verify transactions (by design, sovereign 
governments, central banks and regulated banks are all superfluous to the 
operation of Bitcoin).46  Instead, each bitcoin is given an identifier,47 and 
each user has an electronic “wallet” in which they keep their bitcoins.48  
Wallets have both public and private identifiers: “A commonly used analo-
gy is that of a letterbox.  The public key is the address of the letterbox.  An-
yone can put a letter in.  But only the owner of the letterbox has the key to 
open it and retrieve the contents.”49  A sender of bitcoins therefore sends 
them to the recipient’s wallet using that wallet’s public identifier, but only 
by using the wallet’s private identifier can the recipient “unlock” and access 
them.50  The location of the bitcoin in the wallet can therefore be seen by 
everyone, but the identity of the person able to access the bitcoin at that lo-
cation remains hidden.  These unique identifiers ensure that transactions us-
ing Bitcoin are pseudonymous rather than anonymous—they do not reveal 
                                                          
 44.  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 1.  The latest theory is that Satoshi Nakomoto is actual-
ly an Australian man named Craig Steven Wright.  See Andy Greenberg & Gwern Branwen, 
Bitcoin’s Creator Satoshi Nakamoto Is Probably This Unknown Australian Genius, WIRED (Dec. 
8, 2015; 4:25 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/bitcoins-creator-satoshi-nakamoto-is-
probably-this-unknown-australian-genius. 
 45.  EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS 15 
(2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf [hereinafter ECB 
2015].  It is very difficult to get accurate and up-to-date information about the number and volume 
of virtual currencies in circulation, but in early 2015, the ECB commented: 
[T]here are a large number of decentralised [virtual currency schemes], namely around 
500 [virtual currency schemes] with a total market capitalisation of about €3.3 billion.  
The majority of [virtual currency schemes] have insignificant market capitalisation, i.e. 
below €1 million.  Only 21 [virtual currency schemes] exceed this figure, and only the 
top eight are above €10 million. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing CRYPTO-CURRENCY MARKET CAPITALIZATIONS, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited May 17, 2017)).  Bitcoin is clearly the largest and most 
well-established virtual currency, with a market capitalization of more than $28 billion as of May 
2017.  Market Capitalization, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/charts/market-cap?timespan 
=all&daysAverageString=1&scale=1&address= (last visited May 17, 2017).  There are also a 
number of post-Bitcoin virtual currencies (often referred to as “altcoins”) that claim to be superior 
to Bitcoin, including Litecoin, GeistGeld, SolidCoin, BBQcoin, and PPCoin.  Stephen T. Middle-
brook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues 
and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 819–20 (2014). 
 46.  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 1. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Murck, supra note 3, at 4. 
 49.  Fairfield, supra note 23, at 820 (citing BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 31–
32 (1996)). 
 50.  Id. 
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personal information about either user, but there is a permanent and public-
ly available (albeit encrypted) record of the users’ participation in the trans-
action.51 
Each transaction involving an identified user and bitcoin is recorded 
on what is known as the “blockchain,” or the “distributed ledger” (a large, 
decentralized database that is maintained on a network of computers rather 
than a single server, and that is updated in real-time).52  The blockchain is 
the definitive word on who the owner of a bitcoin is, ensuring that bitcoins 
cannot be spent twice,53 but Bitcoin does not rely on any central authority to 
verify the transactions that are added to the blockchain.54  Instead, transac-
tions are verified by members of the public known as “miners,” who use 
significant amounts of computer power to make repeated guesses of an arbi-
trary number (this is known as “hashing”).55  Only when they succeed in 
guessing that arbitrary number are the miners given the authority to add a 
transaction to the blockchain.56  To compensate the miners for the time and 
computer processing power expended in the verification process, the miners 
are rewarded (at least for now) with new bitcoins.57 
II.  WHAT IS A CURRENCY (OR MONEY)? 
The USD, euro, and Bitcoin introduced in the previous Part are all of-
ten referred to as “currency” or “money.”  This Part will consider more pre-
cisely what “currency” and “money” mean, focusing on the institutions that 
                                                          
 51.  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 3.  “[U]sing sophisticated computer analysis, transac-
tions involving large quantities of Bitcoin can be tracked and claim that if paired with current law 
enforcement tools it would be possible to gain a lot of information on the persons moving the 
Bitcoins.”  Id. (citing Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fist Full of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments 
Among Men with No Name, ;LOGIN:, December 2013, at 10). 
 52.  Wright & De Filippi, supra note 23, at 2; ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 1. 
 53.  Fairfield supra note 23, at 821.  Professor Fairfield elaborates:  
[T]ransactions during a ten-minute period of time are gathered by [miners] into a dis-
crete “block” of transactions.  Once the transactions in a given block of time are verifi-
ably baked into the overall list of transactions, they become the latest block of transac-
tions in a chain of such blocks, hence the term block chain.  The block chain constitutes 
a complete transaction history of all transfers of the asset (and, indeed, all other assets 
recorded in the chain), going back to the creation or original allocation of the asset.  All 
transactions must be registered with the chain and included in a block to transfer the in-
terest. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first citing J.P. & G.T., Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST: BABBAGE (June 13, 
2011, 8:30 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency; then citing 
ECB (2012); and then citing Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital 
Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 116 (2012)). 
 54.  Id. at 808. 
 55.  See ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 1–2; Fairfield supra 23, at 821–22. 
 56.  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 2.  For a detailed discussion of the verification process, 
see Fairfield supra 23, at 821–23. 
 57.  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 2. 
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are connected with such statuses, and the degree to which the USD, euro, 
and Bitcoin are substitutable. 
A.  Legal Definitions of “Currency” 
The ECB has expressed its view that a virtual currency like Bitcoin is 
“not money or currency from a legal perspective.”58  A number of Eurozone 
countries have also publicly announced that Bitcoin and its brethren do not 
constitute currencies under their national legislation.  Sweden, for example, 
defines currencies as being, inter alia, “tied to a central bank or a geograph-
ic area.”59  Bitcoin and other decentralized virtual currencies are designed to 
dispense with central bank imprimaturs and geographical localization, so 
they do not constitute “currencies” in Sweden.60  As of 2015, authorities in 
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Slovenia, and Spain had similarly concluded 
that Bitcoin is not a currency.61  Most other countries in the Eurozone have 
so far remained silent on the specific question of whether virtual currencies 
are “currencies,” although many of them have stated that virtual currencies 
do not constitute legal tender in their jurisdiction.62   
United States Treasury regulations currently define “currency” as: 
The coin and paper money of the United States or of any other 
country that is designated as legal tender and that circulates and is 
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the 
country of issuance.  Currency includes U.S. silver certificates, 
U.S. notes and Federal Reserve notes.  Currency also includes of-
ficial foreign bank notes that are customarily used and accepted 
as a medium of exchange in a foreign country.63 
This Treasury definition of “currency” does not seem to include 
Bitcoin, or any other virtual currency that lacks a government imprimatur, 
but in a 2013 Interpretive Guidance Note, the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network (“FinCEN”), a department of the U.S. Treasury Department, 
edged a little closer towards recognizing virtual currencies as legal “curren-
cies.”64  FinCEN stated that “‘virtual’ currency is a medium of exchange 
that operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all 
                                                          
 58.  ECB 2015, supra note 45, at 4. 
 59.  Id. at 31. 
 60.  See id.  
 61.  Id. at 34–37.  For a regularly updated summary of regulatory approaches to Bitcoin in 
different jurisdictions around the world, see Regulation of Bitcoin in Selected Jurisdictions, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/ (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 62.  ECB 2015, supra note 45, at 34–37. 
 63.  31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(m) (2016). 
 64.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
GUIDANCE NOTE FIN-2013-G001 (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/ 
shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
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the attributes of real currency.  In particular, virtual currency does not have 
legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”65 
If virtual currencies become increasingly accepted in our society, it is 
conceivable that more legislators, central banks, and regulatory bodies in 
the United States and the Eurozone could change their definitions of “cur-
rency” to encompass virtual currencies that are not issued by any particular 
country, or localized to any particular geographic area.  Even in the absence 
of legislative or regulatory change, if virtual currencies achieve a high level 
of acceptance amongst businesses and consumers, definitions of “currency” 
might change by virtue of court decisions that recognize the practical im-
portance of virtual currencies.  For example, a recent decision from the 
Eastern District of Texas held: 
It is clear that Bitcoin can be used as money.  It can be used to 
purchase goods or services, and . . . used to pay for individual liv-
ing expenses.  The only limitation of Bitcoin is that it is limited to 
those places that accept it as currency.  However, it can also be 
exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, 
Euro, Yen, and Yuan.  Therefore, Bitcoin is a currency or form of 
money.66 
In the end, though, this formalistic definitional analysis of what consti-
tutes a “currency” for legal purposes is likely to be unimportant to many us-
ers of virtual currencies.  So long as there are no legal restrictions that pre-
vent the use of virtual currencies,67 many consumers will likely not care if 
instruments satisfy any legal definition of “currency” so long as the virtual 
currency can function as money.68  The following Section will therefore ex-
plore the concept of “money” from a more functional perspective. 
B.  Functional Definitions of “Money” 
The law can delineate what serves as “money” for a particular purpose 
(for example, in a bankruptcy, for accounting purposes, or for government 
surveys of the money supply),69 but it cannot prevent an instrument from 
                                                          
 65.  Id. at 1.  
 66.  SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
 67.  The few existing regulations that pertain to the use of virtual currencies are discussed 
infra Part IV.A. 
 68.  See ROSA MARÍA LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
STABILITY 15 (2006).  Lastra notes that the law in general “tends to reflect a restrictive notion of 
money as ‘currency’ (physical notes and coins), leaving aside other ‘monetary assets’ such as 
bank deposits.”  Id.  At present, definitional matters seem much more important to regulators (who 
are trying to figure out if they have jurisdiction over the evolving technologies) than to users of 
the virtual currencies.  For a discussion of legal restrictions on virtual currencies, see infra Part 
IV.A.  
 69.  Ricks, supra note 15, at 80, 89–90. 
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functioning as money from an economic perspective.  Money is usually de-
scribed as performing three main functions: it acts as a unit of account, a 
store of value, and a medium of exchange.70  Money serves as a unit of ac-
count when it “acts as a standard numerical unit for the measurement of 
value and costs of goods, services, assets and liabilities”71—although this 
has traditionally been a characteristic of money, an instrument can function 
as “money” even if it does not serve as a unit of account, so long as its val-
ue can otherwise be reliably assessed.72  The more important attributes of 
money are its ability to function as a store of value (meaning that it “can be 
saved and retrieved in the future”),73 and that it is widely accepted as a 
means of exchange.74  To function as a means of exchange, the instrument 
must facilitate “decentralised transfer, whereby . . . value can be transferred 
from one person to another.”75  In other words, both parties to a transaction 
must repose sufficient trust in either the instrument itself, or the issuer of 
that instrument, that they believe that others will also honor the instrument 
in future transactions at a (relatively) stable value.76  We typically think of 
sovereign currencies like the USD performing these functions, but in fact—
given the right circumstances—instruments issued or controlled by private 
entities can also operate as “money.”  As Mankiw has noted, “in the end, 
the use of money in exchange is largely a social convention.”77 
The ECB recently concluded that because Bitcoin’s value is currently 
very volatile, and because bitcoins are only accepted by a limited number of 
users, Bitcoin cannot presently act as a store of value or means of exchange 
and should not be thought of as “money.”78  However, the ECB did concede 
that as virtual currencies evolve, it is possible that they could come to func-
tion as money if their value stabilizes.79  After all, stranger things (including 
animal pelts and tobacco) have served as money in the past.80  In the Pacific 
island of Yap, for example, different sized limestone discs (sometimes so 
                                                          
 70.  ECB 2012, supra note 37, at 10. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-a-stable-electronic-currency.html.  
Shiller has argued, “[h]istory shows that this unit-of-account function of money has been separat-
ed from the other two, and to good purpose.”  Id.  
 73.  ECB 2012, supra note 37, at 10. 
 74.  LASTRA, supra note 68, at 14. 
 75.  FELIX MARTIN, MONEY: THE UNAUTHORISED BIOGRAPHY 257 (2014). 
 76.  Id. at 258. 
 77.  N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 158 (4th ed. 2000).  
 78.  ECB 2015, supra note 45, at 23–24.  
 79.  Id. at 25. 
 80.  David Wolman, A Short History of American Money, From Fur to Fiat, ATLANTIC (Feb. 
6, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/02/a-short-history-of-american-mone 
y-from-fur-to-fiat/252620/. 
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large that they were almost impossible to move) known as “rai” functioned 
as money for generations.81  The durability of rai made them an excellent 
store of value.  Smaller rai could physically change hands to effect ex-
changes,82 but it was very difficult for the large and heavy rai to be physi-
cally moved, and so a local custom developed of “transferring title of mon-
ey without moving it”83—a very modern notion that recognized that it is the 
system of credit associated with the monetary unit, rather than physical pos-
session of the monetary unit itself, that underpins an effective payment sys-
tem.  Even the heaviest rai were therefore able to serve as a means of ex-
change, as well as a store of value.  Rai functioned as money even though 
they did not provide a consistent numerical unit for denominating obliga-
tions and therefore could not serve as a unit of account: no individual disc 
“had a definite, unalterable value.  Buying power was always dependent 
upon the social position of the buyer and the receiver, as well as the occa-
sion for use.”84  However, while “[v]alue was somewhat relative in such 
dealings, . . . it was never arbitrary.  Custom and tradition established a firm 
criteria of exchange”85—these rai could therefore be used as a reliable store 
of value and means of exchange even though they did not represent a stand-
ardized unit of account. 
Skipping ahead to a more recent example, in the mid-2000s, AAA-
rated mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) achieved money status.  Like the 
rai, these were not really used as a unit of account, but they did function 
both as a store of value and as a means of exchange in the lead-up to the Fi-
nancial Crisis because they had both a relatively stable value and were read-
ily accepted as collateral for transactions like repo agreements between 
banks.86  Repo agreements are agreements to sell securities bundled with a 
                                                          
 81.  See generally CORA LEE C. GILLILLAND, THE STONE MONEY OF YAP: A NUMISMATIC 
SURVEY 1, 9, 10–11 (1975), http://www.sil.si.edu/smithsoniancontributions/HistoryTechnology/ 
pdf_hi/SSHT-0023.pdf. 
 82.  Id. at 11 (“[M]ore portable ‘coins’ were used for the purchase of fish.”). 
 83.  See id. at 10–11, 18. 
 84.  Id. at 12. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial 
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2014) (reviewing ANAT ADMATI & 
MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT (2013); SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET 
FROM WALL STREET AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF (2012); NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW 
WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET (2012); BEN S. 
BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2013); ALAN S. BLINDER, 
AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE AND THE WORK AHEAD 
(2013); JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS (2012)).  Levitin 
explained:  
These [AAA-rate MBS] were used as one of the predominant forms of collateral 
throughout the financial system, particularly for short-term lending in repo markets, 
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promise to buy back those securities in the future, and they function as a 
type of short-term secured loan.87  Because repo agreements are so short-
term (they often have overnight maturities), the likelihood of default is neg-
ligible—at least in normal times.88  Banks rely heavily on repo agreements 
from other banks to fund their investments, and the MBSs that functioned 
as collateral for such repo agreements facilitated the transfer of funds from 
one bank to another.89  However, once the Financial Crisis hit, banks dis-
trusted valuations of MBSs and would no longer accept them as collateral 
for repo transactions.  Once MBSs were no longer a reliable store of value, 
they (and the repos that relied on them for collateral) lost their status as 
money.90  As Levitin described it, “[o]nce the value of the [MBS] became 
questionable, the whole system started to collapse, much as if the value of a 
currency became in doubt.”91 
Gorton has conceptualized this loss of money status as an issue of “in-
formation insensitivity”: instruments can attain money status if they are be-
lieved to be sufficiently reliable that there is no need to expend time or ef-
fort in assessing the likelihood that the instrument will be honored at the 
expected value.92  However, once the trust in such instrument and its issuer 
starts to erode, the terms of the instrument do become important and require 
time-consuming and diligent investigation, which raises questions about 
valuation and prevents the instrument from being accepted automatically as 
a means of exchange—thus eroding its liquidity and its money status.93  In-
vestors then fly to “an asset which is surely informationally-insensitive—
cash.”94  The next two Sections will explore why cash (i.e. central bank lia-
bilities, particularly the USD) is considered so reliable as a form of money.  
First, the much-studied relationship between central banks and monetary 
policy is explained, and then the less well-defined relationship between 
governments and their currencies is considered. 
                                                          
where they were accepted as collateral at par value. . . .  AAA-rated bonds were used as 
a medium of exchange among financial institutions.  For this to work, however, the 
medium of exchange had to maintain a steady value. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC 
OF 2007, at 6–7 (2010)). 
 87.  Hilary J. Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 125, 145 
(2012). 
 88.  Ricks, supra note 15, at 79, 85. 
 89.  Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007 
(May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id= 
1401882 (“If securitization debt is informationally-insensitive, it can be an input into the repo sys-
tem of creating a kind of transaction medium, i.e., collateral that can be rehypothecated.”).  
 90.  Ricks, supra note 15, at 84. 
 91.  Levitin, supra note 86, at 2009. 
 92.  Gorton, supra note 89, at 6–7. 
 93.  Id. at 18. 
 94.  Id. 
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C.  Central Banks and Monetary Policy 
The purpose of central banking has evolved over time,95 and even to-
day, different central banks around the world have been given different 
mandates by their legislatures.  However, the one mandate that the Federal 
Reserve and the ECB share (and for which they generally have political 
support) is to protect their currencies by seeking to match the supply of 
money to the needs of the economy and thus maintain price stability.96  
Price stability mandates dictate that central banks avoid high inflation, 
which creates uncertainty about the future and erodes the store of value that 
the sovereign currency is intended to provide.97  If the prices of consumer 
goods and services increase only in a slow and reliable way over time, the 
sovereign currency should continue to be honored at a value that matches 
public expectations about what the currency can buy—only then will the 
sovereign currency be trusted as a reliable store of value.98  A central bank 
that commits, in advance, to a credible inflation target promotes continuing 
confidence in a currency. 
To effect their price stability mandates, central banks regularly moni-
tor prices and use a variety of tools to move inflation towards their target 
rates: chief amongst them is the setting of interest rates.99  Central banks al-
so manage their currencies indirectly through their public communications, 
which “are prepared for the purpose of shaping economic and monetary 
                                                          
 95.  For example, the first central banks were created for the purpose of government finance.  
Lastra, supra note 43, at 1262. 
 96.  Compare Why Does the Federal Reserve Aim for 2 Percent Inflation Over Time?, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14400.htm 
(last updated Jan. 26, 2015) (noting one of the Federal Reserve’s mandates as price stability), with 
Monetary Policy, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html 
(last visited May 17, 2017) (“The primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is to maintain 
price stability.”).  Monetary policy seeks to promote price stability by targeting a rate of inflation 
close to defined benchmarks.  In the United States, the Federal Open Markets Committee of the 
Federal Reserve System targets an inflation rate of two percent.  Why Does the Federal Reserve 
Aim for 2 Percent Inflation Over Time?, supra.  Similarly, the ECB has a targeted inflation rate 
below, but close to, two percent.  Monetary Policy, supra. 
 97.  Why Does the Federal Reserve Aim for 2 Percent Inflation over Time?, supra note 96.  
Inflation “erodes savings, discourages investment, stimulates capital flight (as domestic investors 
put their funds into foreign assets, precious metals, or unproductive real estate), inhibits growth, 
makes economic planning a nightmare, and, in its extreme form, provokes social and political un-
rest.”  Sarwat Jahan, Inflation Targeting: Holding the Line, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2012). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Ricks, supra note 15, at 77.  When interest rates are low, the availability of credit theoret-
ically should increase, allowing consumers and businesses to borrow more (thus giving them more 
purchasing power).  See id.  When more people want to buy more goods, that drives prices up—
increasing inflation.  An increase in rates conversely results in a reduction in the amount of the 
money in the economy, which slows the economy in general and the rising prices—reducing the 
likelihood of inflation and inspiring confidence that currency will hold its purchasing power.  See 
id. 
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conditions prospectively, as instruments of persuasion.”100  These commu-
nications “are not merely expressing an interpretative account or commen-
tary; they are making the economy itself.”101  In other words, central banks 
create expectations through the way they portray the future, and when mar-
ket actors act on the basis of these communications, they allow such expec-
tations to be achieved—as Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen has 
noted, “the explanation is the policy.”102  When confidence is damaged, 
then central banks adjust their communications “to address the spectrum of 
sentiments and expectations that can underwrite or undercut public confi-
dence.”103 
Of course, central bank action is not the only thing that impacts the 
credibility of a currency—as will be explored in the next Section, the issu-
ing government’s fiscal policy is also relevant.  This is why the euro is such 
a fascinating innovation: in supporting the euro, the supranational ECB is 
required to work with disparate national governments with different fiscal 
conditions and policies.104  This system seemed to work well through most 
of the 2000s, but serious problems with the euro became evident in the 
wake of the Financial Crisis.  Many European countries had been relying on 
cheap borrowed money to fund their fiscs, but as credit dried up in the wake 
of the Crisis, it became increasingly expensive for countries with less pros-
perous economies to borrow money.105  The situation was particularly dire 
in Portugal and Greece (which eventually required bailouts from the Euro-
pean Commission, the ECB and the IMF—the so-called “troika”), but con-
cerns were also raised about the sustainability of sovereign debt in many 
other Eurozone nations.106  Investors became concerned not only about 
                                                          
 100.  Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 15, 17 (2014). 
 101.  Id. at 18. 
 102.  Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
Society of American Business Editors and Writers 50th Anniversary Conference: Communication 
in Monetary Policy 9 (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen 
20130404a.pdf.  
 103.  Holmes, supra note 100, at 33. 
 104.  Cukierman, supra note 10, at 382. 
 105.  Christopher Alessi & James McBride, CFR Backgrounders: The Eurozone in Crisis, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/eu/eurozone-crisis/p22055. 
 106.  Id.  Concerns were raised about Belgium, Spain, Italy, and even France and Austria.  Id.; 
see also Stratfor, Belgium and Austria Are Now Targets as Europe’s Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Spreads, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2010, 10:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/europe-
sovereign-debt-austria-belgium-2010-12.  Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus were also bailed out, alt-
hough the immediate motivation for these bailouts was in response to housing-related banking 
crises, rather than unsustainable sovereign debt.  Alessi & McBride, supra note 105.  Banking and 
sovereign debt crises can be interlinked: questions about Ireland’s ability to honor its sovereign 
debt arose because of the size of the bailouts the Irish government gave to its banks.  For a de-
tailed discussion of the Irish situation, see INT’L MONETARY FUND, IRELAND: LESSONS FROM ITS 
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these countries’ ability to repay, but also about redenomination risk.  There 
was a fear that Greece would be forced to exit the Eurozone and in doing so 
would redenominate its obligations in a new currency.107  As a result, all eu-
ros were no longer viewed as equal: a German bank might trust euro-
denominated obligations issued in Germany, but not euro-denominated ob-
ligations issued in Greece.108  The euro was increasingly undermined as a 
means of inter-country exchange, and lending across Eurozone borders 
dried up.109 
In light of this state of affairs, the ECB metamorphosed into a more in-
terventionist central bank in an attempt to bolster confidence in all euro-
denominated obligations.110  In many ways, Mario Draghi, who became the 
President of the ECB on November 1, 2011,111 was the architect of this new 
ECB.  Under Draghi, the ECB launched a number of programs designed to 
provide liquidity to Eurozone financial institutions,112 in the hope that such 
                                                          
RECOVERY FROM THE BANK-SOVEREIGN LOOP (2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/ 
2015/eur1501.pdf.  
 107.  Lorenzo Codogno & Paul De Grauwe, Both Greece and Its Creditors Must Compromise 
to Prevent the Risk of a Grexit, LONDON SCH. OF ECON.: EUROPEAN POL. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 
26, 2015), http://bit.ly/1EVAX54 (“[R]edenomination risk . . . [means] that banks and corpora-
tions would view across border exposures as risky despite the fact that they are denominated in the 
same euros.”).   
 108.  Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank, Speech at the Global Investment Confer-
ence (July 26, 2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
 109.  Id. (“The interbank market is not functioning.  It is only functioning very little within 
each country by the way, but it is certainly not functioning across countries.”); see also A.P., 
Breaking Up Is Slow to Do, ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE BLOG (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/05/euro-zone-crisis.  
 110.  McNamara, supra note 42, at 147, 149.  The ECB’s mandate, as established by treaty, 
focuses narrowly on price stability.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union art. 127 & 282, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (“The primary objective of the [Europe-
an Central Bank, together with the national central banks] shall be to maintain price stability.  
Without prejudice to [that objective], [it] shall support the general economic policies in the Union 
with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union.”). 
 111.  Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Change of Presidency of the European Central 
Bank (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111101.en.html. 
 112.  MARCEL FRATZSCHER ET AL., ECB UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY ACTIONS: 
MARKET IMPACT, INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS AND TRANSMISSION CHANNELS 6–7 (2014), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2014/arc/pdf/fratzscher_loluca_straub.pdf.  For a 
discussion of the measures taken prior to October 2014, see id.  In January of 2015, the ECB an-
nounced an expanded asset purchase programme, which commenced on March 9, 2015.  This pro-
gramme involves: 
[C]ombined monthly purchases of EUR 60 bn in public and private sector securities, 
purchases under the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) of marketable debt in-
struments issued by euro area central governments, certain agencies located in the euro 
area or certain international or supranational institutions (referred to in legal texts as 
“international organisations and multilateral development banks”) . . . . 
Text: ECB Statement Regarding Public Sector Purchase Program, MNI (Mar. 5, 2015; 9:45 AM), 
https://www.marketnews.com/content/text-ecb-statement-regarding-public-sector-purchase-
program. 
 896 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:877 
 
programs would provide sufficient comfort and funds to restart the cross-
border lending market (and that all euros would once again be viewed as 
equal).113  Despite questions regarding the legality of some of these pro-
grams, Draghi asserts “there was a paramount authority—the ECB’s consti-
tutional mandate to manage monetary policy across the Eurozone—that 
overruled restrictions on bond purchases as well as other unorthodox inter-
ventions.”114  These interventions, coupled with Draghi’s bold commitment 
to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro,115 resulted in a period of rela-
tive calm commencing in July of 2012.116 
Draghi’s actions illustrate that in times of panic, central bank actions 
can compensate, at least to some degree, for a lack of centralized fiscal 
backing of a currency.  But there are limits on what central banks can 
achieve.117  In extreme circumstances, central banks acting alone may be 
unable to maintain confidence in their currency as a store of value and read-
ily accepted means of exchange.  Governments and their fiscal policies will 
also be essential to this effort. 
D.  Governments and Currencies 
Surprisingly, while there is a wealth of scholarship on how central 
bank policies affect the credibility of the currencies they administer, there 
are few sources discussing how the fiscal policies pursued by national gov-
ernments affect their sovereign currencies.  It is self-evident, however, that 
a government’s fiscal policies will have an impact on the credibility, and 
thus the stability, of a national currency.118  Some have argued that a gov-
ernment’s commitment to small deficits and avoiding inflation is likely to 
create confidence in its currency, as this suggests that the currency will re-
main a safe store of value.119  Indeed, this was one of the justifications ad-
                                                          
 113.  Draghi, supra note 108 (“I think the key strategy point here is that if we want to get out 
of this crisis, we have to repair this financial fragmentation.”).  
 114.  Holmes, supra note 100, at 53 (citing Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank, 
Introductory Statement to the Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the 
European Parliament (July 9, 2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120 
709.en.html).  
 115.  Draghi, supra note 108. 
 116.  Holmes, supra note 100, at 47. 
 117.  McNamara, supra note 42, at 146. 
 118.  Christine Desan, The Market as a Matter of Money: Denaturalizing Economic Currency 
in American Constitutional History, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 19 (2005) (“In the case of public 
bills, holders estimate the security of their claims, and therefore their value, by considering the 
government’s fiscal policy and the credibility of claims that it will stay that course.”).   
 119.  BRUMMER, supra note 11, at 125; see also Jack Ewing, Weighing the Fallout of a Greek 
Exit from the Euro, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/business/ 
international/drachma-grexit-eurozone.html?_r=0.  Ewing elaborated:  
And ironically, some economists say, the best way to bolster a currency’s value is for 
the government to impose exactly the kind of austerity budgets that Prime Minister 
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vanced for abandoning the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
for a floating rate system in the 1970s: “Optimists hoped that leaders would 
be forced to make prudent macroeconomic decisions and adjust domestic 
economic policies in the face of headwinds in order to maintain the confi-
dence of foreign creditors.”120  Conversely, profligate spending may indi-
cate impending inflation and weaken expectations that the currency will 
remain a safe store of value.121  However, there is no precise mathematical 
formula for engendering confidence in a currency through fiscal policy.  
Confidence is a complex narrative construct that Akerlof and Shiller de-
scribe as “a view of the world—a popular model of current events, a public 
understanding of the mechanism of economic change as informed by the 
news media and by popular discussions.”122  As such, one cannot state with 
any certainty that a certain level of debt, or deficit, or debt-to-GDP ratio, 
will maintain or undermine confidence in a particular currency.  Indeed, 
markets are much more tolerant of high debt-to-GDP ratios in the United 
States and Japan than they are of lower ratios in Europe.123 
Nonetheless, the architects of the euro identified inflation, deficit, and 
debt-to-GDP ratio thresholds that countries had to meet to join, and remain 
in, the Eurozone.124  Prior to the Financial Crisis, however, these criteria 
were not applied with any stringency: “There was shockingly weak due dil-
igence in assessing suitability for entry into the euro, and an equally weak 
application of the few rules that were supposed to police its operation.”125  
Once sovereign debt became harder to come by in the wake of the Financial 
Crisis, it became clear that Greece in particular was in deplorable fiscal 
condition.126   A fiscally unified entity like the United States could pool re-
sources and allocate them where needed, but this was impossible in the Eu-
rozone where there is no joint fiscal policy amongst its member states.127  A 
bailout from the troika was therefore required for Greece (and also Portugal, 
                                                          
Alexis Tsipras of Greece has promised to abolish.  “You need restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policy, which is something the Greek government does not want to do,” said 
Adalbert Winkler, a professor at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management. 
Ewing, supra.  
 120.  BRUMMER, supra note 11, at 129. 
 121.  Id. at 125–26. 
 122.  GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN 
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 55 
(2009). 
 123.  McNamara, supra note 42, at 145. 
 124.  Alessi & McBride, supra note 105 (“[S]tates joining the euro . . . must ensure inflation 
below 1.5 percent, budget deficits below 3 percent of GDP, and a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 
60 percent.”).   
 125.  JASON MANOLOPOULOS, GREECE’S ‘ODIOUS’ DEBT: THE LOOTING OF THE HELLENIC 
REPUBLIC BY THE EURO, THE POLITICAL ELITE AND THE INVESTMENT COMMUNITY 163 (2011).  
 126.  Alessi & McBride, supra note 105.   
 127.  BRUMMER, supra note 11, at 136. 
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Ireland, Cyprus and Spain),128 instead of a reallocation of funds from more 
prosperous Eurozone nations like Germany, which could have occurred in a 
fictionalized federalized Europe with truly integrated fiscal policy.  The 
bailouts granted were conditioned on strict requirements of austerity (in-
cluding increased taxes and cuts on wages and pensions), which have 
proved punishing for the nations involved.129  By May of 2014, Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal had exited their bailout programs, but Greece continues 
to struggle.130 
In January of 2015, the Greek people elected the Syriza party to pow-
er, which had campaigned on an anti-austerity platform.131  Negotiations 
over the terms of Greece’s bailout deteriorated in the first half of 2015, as 
the new Greek government sought to renegotiate the austerity-related condi-
tions attached to its bailout funds.132  In early July of 2015, it seemed dis-
tinctly possible that no agreement would be reached between Greece and 
the troika, with the result that Greece would default on its debt and leave 
the Eurozone (and perhaps even the European Union).133  Although there 
was no clear plan for how a so-called “Grexit” might occur, many took the 
view that Greek obligations that were denominated in euros pre-Grexit 
would have to be redenominated in some new currency, which would swift-
ly depreciate against the euro.134  A Grexit would certainly have a dramatic 
impact on the Greeks, but from this Article’s perspective, the most relevant 
concern is that a Grexit could permanently undermine confidence in the eu-
ro, as users would fear that other countries would follow suit and redenomi-
nate into another currency.135  In other words, the euro would become less 
reliable as a store of value simply because of its potential to change into 
some other type of obligation by virtue of the unilateral action of any of the 
Eurozone governments—and as a less reliable store of value, it would be 
less readily accepted as a means of exchange. 
This eventuality was avoided—at least for a time—after an all-night 
meeting resulted in an agreement on July 13, 2015, which “would give 
                                                          
 128.  Alessi & McBride, supra note 105.   
 129.  Id.   
 130.  Id.   
 131.  Id.   
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Ewing, supra note 119. 
 134.  See, e.g., Douglas J. Elliott, How Might Greece Fall Out of the Eurozone?, BROOKINGS 
(Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/20-how-might-
greece-fall-out-of-eurozone-elliott; Zoning Out: Why Leaving the Euro Would Still Be Bad for 
Both Greece and the Currency Area, ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE BLOG (Jan. 17, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21639591-why-leaving-euro-would-
still-be-bad-both-greece-and-currency. 
 135.  Zoning Out: Why Leaving the Euro Would Still Be Bad for Both Greece and the Currency 
Area, supra note 134. 
 2017] $=€=BITCOIN? 899 
 
Greece the chance to receive its third international bailout in five years, a 
package of as much as 86 billion euros, or $96 billion, as well as easier re-
payment terms on some of its existing debt of more than €300 billion and a 
short-term economic stimulus plan.”136  None of Greece’s existing debt was 
forgiven under this plan, though, and as the IMF has stated publicly, 
Greece’s existing debt burden is unsustainable.137  As such, the July 2015 
deal seemed very much to be just kicking the can down the road, and unless 
some debt relief is given, Greece may be forced to abandon the euro after 
all. 
E.  Arguments for Privately Issued Money 
If Greece is forced to leave the Eurozone, it will likely take some time 
for Greek citizens, and others, to trust in any new Greek currency as a relia-
ble store of value and means of exchange.138  Many have drawn parallels 
between the Greek situation and that of Argentina, which has a history of 
sovereign debt crisis, financial instability, government currency controls, 
and high inflation.139  As a result, there is a longstanding distrust of the Ar-
gentinian peso, and Bitcoin has become popular in Argentina as a medium 
for everyday transactions.140  In countries without reliable government and 
central banking institutions, privately issued money may be a more appeal-
ing alternative than sovereign-issued fiat currencies.141  However, as this 
                                                          
 136.  Suzanne Daley & Liz Alderman, Premier of Greece, Alex Tsipras, Accepts Creditors’ 
Austerity Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/world/europe 
/greece-debt-plan.html. 
 137.  Alison Smale, Germany Votes to Move Ahead with Greek Bailout, but Opposition Grows, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/world/europe/germany-greece-
bailout-talks.html (“Christine Lagarde, managing director of the fund, said in an interview with 
Europe 1 radio on Friday that the Greek bailout plan was ‘categorically not’ viable without debt 
relief.”).  
 138.  Ewing, supra note 119. 
 139.  See, e.g., Mario Blejer & Guillermo Ortiz, Latin Lessons, ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE 
BLOG (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547750; Larry Elliot, Could Greece 
Emulate Argentina’s Success After It Defaulted in 2001?, GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/08/greek-crisis-emulate-argentina-default-success; 
Paul Krugman, Opinion, Argentine Lessons for Greece, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015, 10:24 AM), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/argentine-lessons-for-greece/. 
 140.  Nathaniel Popper, Can Bitcoin Conquer Argentina?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/magazine/how-bitcoin-is-disrupting-argentinas-
economy.html.  Friedman and Schwartz have argued that privately issued money will only be-
come an attractive alternative to a sovereign currency if there is hyperinflation, or some other ma-
jor collapse of the sovereign currency (and even then, they argue that the privately issued money 
would need to be backed by some type of commodity).  Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 
Has Government Any Role in Money?, in MONEY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 289, 301 (Anna J. 
Schwartz ed., 1987). 
 141.  Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 140, at 307.  Part of the appeal of the U.S. dollar as 
reserve currency is due to the perceived stability of its political institutions.  BRUMMER, supra 
note 11, at 130.  It is possible that, as some have predicted, “[t]he power of friction-free transac-
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Part will explore, sovereign currencies with solid central bank and govern-
ment backing are much more stable than any privately issued money: the 
legal and institutional environment in which such currencies exist provides 
an assurance of continuing liquidity that cannot be matched by the private 
sector.  As such, efforts to displace sovereign currencies are misguided. 
Perhaps the most prominent argument for privately issued money (also 
referred to as market-based money) was made by Friedrich Hayek in a 1977 
Wall Street Journal article advocating for allowing “free enterprise the right 
to supply the good money it needs, money which competition would un-
doubtedly long ago have provided if it had not been prohibited by govern-
ment.”142  Citing concerns about the state intervention associated with sov-
ereign currencies (particularly the ability of central banks to flood the 
economy with credit by manipulating the money supply), Hayek advocated 
for privately issued money to supplant sovereign-issued fiat currencies.143  
In Hayek’s view, the major impediments to the development of market-
based forms of money were the laws that national governments enacted re-
stricting privately issued money.144  In fact, though, the law is circum-
scribed in its ability to limit the types of money that can be used in a sover-
eign territory. 
Although it is true that the U.S. Constitution reserves to the govern-
ment the right to coin money and regulate the value thereof,145 and there are 
prohibitions on the use of instruments “intended to circulate as money or to 
be received or used in lieu of lawful money of the United States,”146 such 
laws have been understood to prohibit counterfeit bills and coins that pur-
port to be USD—not to prohibit other types of money that are unlikely to be 
confused with USD.147  Furthermore, although governments can and do rule 
on what constitutes “legal tender” in their jurisdictions,148 the importance of 
legal tender status is perhaps overstated.  In the United States, federal legis-
lation provides that “United States coins and currency . . . are legal tender 
                                                          
tions over the Internet will unleash the typical forces of consolidation and globalization, and we 
will end up with six digital currencies: US Dollar, euro, Yen, Pound, Renminbi and Bitcoin.”  
Popper, supra note 140 (quoting a privately distributed paper by Charlie Songhurst, Microsoft’s 
head of corporate strategy).  
 142.  Hayek, supra note 20. 
 143.  ECB 2012, supra note 37, at 22 (citing FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE DENATIONALISATION 
OF MONEY (1976)). 
 144.  Hayek, supra note 20. 
 145.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.  
 146.  18 U.S.C. § 336 (2012).  
 147.  Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, 18 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 49, 
49 (2015). 
 148.  Lawrence H. White, The Troubling Suppression of Competition from Alternative Monies: 
The Cases of the Liberty Dollar and E-Gold, 34 CATO J. 281, 282–84 (2014). 
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for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues,”149 but as the Treasury De-
partment has pointed out, this only means that such coins and currency are a 
legal offer of payment.150  There is no federal legislation requiring that such 
coins and currency be accepted as payment.151 In Europe, legal tender status 
is somewhat more meaningful: “only euro banknotes and coins are legal 
tender in the countries of the euro area and therefore, by law, must be ac-
cepted as payment for a debt within those countries.”152  Nonetheless, in 
both Europe and the United States, the parties to a transaction are free to 
contract for payments in instruments that do not constitute legal tender.153 
The very existence of Bitcoin—the creation of which was in part in-
spired by Hayekian-libertarian sentiments154—demonstrates that privately 
issued means of payment can exist alongside sovereign currencies.  Alt-
hough the ECB has concluded that, at present, Bitcoin is not sufficiently 
widely used to constitute “money,” this conclusion is based on Bitcoin’s 
current functionality, rather than any legal impediment.155  While many 
countries have ruled that Bitcoin cannot serve as legal tender within their 
borders,156 this only means that agreements to pay in Bitcoin must be estab-
lished upfront by contract, not that it cannot be used as money at all.  In-
stead, the most important impediment to Bitcoin being more widely accept-
ed as “money” is the volatility of the price of a bitcoin,157 which 
undermines its ability to function as a reliable store of value.  Because of 
                                                          
 149.  31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012). 
 150.  Legal Tender Status, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
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low level of acceptance and the high volatility of their exchange rates and thus purchas-
ing power make them unsuitable as a unit of account. 
Id. at 23–24.   
 156.  Id. at 34–37. 
 157.  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 7 (noting that between 2013 and 2015, Bitcoin’s dollar 
exchange rate fluctuated between $50 and over $1,000).  
 902 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:877 
 
this volatility, Bitcoin has found wider popularity among speculators seek-
ing to profit from that volatility than it has among those wishing to use it for 
everyday transactions.158  However, this state of affairs is not immutable. 
As Bitcoin becomes more established and more widely traded, its 
volatility could moderate to the point where Bitcoin becomes more widely 
accepted as a means of exchange.159  Even now, it is already accepted by a 
number of online retailers and other merchants, including Amazon, Dell, 
Expedia, and Overstock.com.160  Importantly, such acceptance does not de-
pend on an entirely rational calculation of a bitcoin’s value.  As the mort-
gage-backed securities bubble that developed prior to the Financial Crisis 
handily illustrates, market participants do not always rationally value finan-
cial instruments.161  Bitcoin may be the subject of another bout of irrational 
exuberance: 
The Bitcoin phenomenon seems to fit the basic definition of a 
speculative bubble—that is, a special kind of fad, a mania for 
holding an asset in expectation of its appreciation.  Further, a 
bubble is publicized and amplified by news of price increases, of-
ten justified by some kind of inspiring “new era” story that at-
tracts more attention as the price rises.  In this case, the narrative 
was that a computer whiz invented a new kind of money in the 
form of electronic currency units, as part of a decentralized com-
puter-driven system for a world economy that extends beyond the 
reach of any single government.162 
This same “new era” thinking could also drive interest in other virtual 
currencies beyond rational levels, notwithstanding that others have called 
out this narrative as overstating the transformative power of virtual curren-
cies (unlike the internet, which was a truly transformative protocol in the 
                                                          
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Tom Polansek, CME, ICE Prepare Pricing Data That Could Boost Bitcoin, REUTERS, 
May 2, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cme-group-bitcoin-idUSKCN0XT1G1.  Both the 
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 160.  Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the 
Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 273 (2015).  
 161.  See generally David Min, Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1421 (2015). 
 162.  Shiller, supra note 72. 
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sense that it is free to use and not owned by anyone, access to a virtual cur-
rency network requires prepayment for the virtual currency).163 
It is thus possible that Bitcoin, or another virtual currency, may come 
to be accepted widely enough that it achieves money status, but just as with 
mortgage-backed securities, that status would be fragile and could easily be 
lost.164  Historically, only instruments that are backed (even if just implicit-
ly) by the full faith and credit of a sovereign government have functioned 
successfully as a currency over a long period of time,165 because non-
sovereign issuers of money are limited in their ability to muster resources to 
back their obligations in the event of a panic.166  There is also no baseline 
natural demand for virtual currencies in the way that there is for sovereign 
currencies.167  At the most basic level, the fact that a country imposes and 
accepts payment of taxes in a currency generates demand for that currency 
and thus gives it value.168  Furthermore, because a government that de-
mands taxation is the most common creditor within a country, “[t]he tokens 
                                                          
 163.  SWANSON, supra note 26, at 18.  Also, in the case of Bitcoin (if not other virtual curren-
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Id. (citation omitted) (citing Gerald P. Dwyer, Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, and Free Bank-
ing in the United States, ECON. REV., Dec. 1996, at 3–6).  
 167.  ECB 2015, supra note 45, at 24 (“[N]o creditor is obliged to accept payment with [a vir-
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 168.  ELWELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 6; Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Two Concepts of Mon-
ey: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency Areas, 14 EURO. J. POL. ECON. 407, 417 
(1998). 
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it [takes], unlike those preferred by any other actor, . . . matter[] to every-
body.”169  Finally, sovereign governments also have access to funding from 
the IMF in times of crisis, which is not available with respect to privately 
issued money.170  As a result, privately issued money is less likely than a 
sovereign currency to be consistently liquid (and just as importantly, market 
participants are less likely to expect liquidity from privately issued money 
when things go awry).171  It is not surprising, then, that we often see a flight 
from privately issued money to cash in times of panic.172  At those times, 
even without according special legal privilege to it, sovereign-issued money 
is considered superior to other types of money.173  Even as prominent a 
free-marketeer as Milton Friedman concluded, “[i]t is dubious that the mar-
ket can by itself provide [a moderately stable monetary] framework.  
Hence, the function of providing one is an essential governmental func-
tion.”174 
Privately issued money that consists of some commodity (like gold) or 
represents a claim on other assets (like a mortgage-backed security) may 
have some underlying value even if it ceases to function as a means of ex-
change.175  A virtual currency, however, is nothing more than a series of 
numbers recorded on a database.176  According to the Bitcoin website, 
bitcoins have value because “they are useful as a form of money.”177  This 
is obviously somewhat circular: as Krugman puts it, bitcoins have value be-
cause “for the time being at least people are willing to buy [them] because 
they believe other people will be willing to buy [them].”178  However, if this 
belief evaporates for any reason and there is no government or central bank 
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to provide support,179 Bitcoin (or any other virtual currency) will no longer 
be accepted as a means of exchange, its store of value will erode, and it will 
lose its status as money.  Virtual currencies also lack any central bank to 
manage their supply to match demand,180 which may also jeopardize the 
virtual currency’s ability to function as a reliable store of value. 
Despite the fact that it is not linked to any commodity, Bitcoin is in 
some ways a high-tech attempt to replicate the gold standard.181  Proponents 
of a return to the gold standard are wary of central bank management, 
which they fear will debase fiat sovereign currencies,182 and so they wish to 
prevent such intervention by tying the value of money to the value of a 
commodity.183  By capping the maximum number of bitcoins to be released 
at 21,000,000,184 the creators of Bitcoin have similarly ensured that it is not 
susceptible to the type of monetary policy intervention that central banks 
deploy to maintain price stability.185  However, when the supply of money 
does not match the demand for it, either inflation or deflation is likely; a 
key reason for abandoning the gold standard as a basis for monetary policy 
in the 1920s and 1930s was the recognition that the demand for gold did not 
predict the demand for other goods and services.186  Nonetheless, the crea-
                                                          
 179.  Possible triggers for a panic are explored infra Part III.B. 
 180.  For example, before the creation of the Federal Reserve, the USD was not always able to 
“accommodate changes in demand that arose from seasonal and cyclical factors and from periods 
of financial crisis.”  Michael J. Lambert & Kristin D. Stanton, Opportunities and Challenges of 
the U.S. Dollar as an Increasingly Global Currency: A Federal Reserve Perspective, 87 FED. RES. 
BULL. 567, 569 (2001).   
 181.  ECB 2012, supra note 37, at 22–23 (“The scheme is inspired by the former gold stand-
ard.”); see also Lawrence H. White, Making the Transition to a New Gold Standard, 32 CATO J. 
411, 411 (2012).  White defines the gold standard as:  
[A] monetary system in which a standard mass (so many grams or ounces) of pure gold 
defines the unit of account, and standardized pieces of gold serve as the ultimate media 
of redemption.  Currency notes, checks, and electronic funds transfers are all denomi-
nated in gold and are redeemable claims to gold. 
Id.   
 182.  Lawrence H. White, Gold Standard with Free Banking Would Have Restrained the Boom 
and Bust, 31 CATO J. 497, 498 (2011) (“A poorly constrained central bank . . . can cheapen credit 
when it thinks it expedient, or when it concedes to political pressure, to try to stimulate the econ-
omy.”).  
 183.  Id. at 502 (“A commodity standard would regulate the quantity of money without the 
need for the wisdom of [the Federal Reserve].”).  
 184.  How Are Bitcoins Created?, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/en/faq#how-are-bitcoins-created 
(last visited May 17, 2017).  Once there are 21 million bitcoins in existence, bitcoin issuance will 
stop.  Id.  
 185.  ECB 2012, supra note 37, at 22. 
 186.  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 208 (1931).  Keynes is critical of the 
gold standard, arguing:  
In truth, the gold standard is already a barbarous relic.  All of us, from the Governor of 
the Bank of England downwards, are now primarily interested in preserving the stabil-
ity of business, prices, and employment, and are not likely, when the choice is forced 
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tors of Bitcoin have constrained the supply of bitcoins without regard to 
fluctuating demand in terms of the prices of goods and services the bitcoins 
are used to buy.187 
As the former head of the Bank of England Mervyn King has noted, it 
is undesirable to precommit to any particular permanent monetary policy 
strategy because “we cannot articulate all possible future states of the 
world.”188  Today, the general consensus is that some form of discretionary 
intervention by central banks is needed to ensure price stability.189  Certain-
ly there is a downside to this discretion—there is always the possibility that 
central bank policy will have negative consequences.  However, the poten-
tial for the unexpected to occur ensures that a “set and forget” monetary 
policy is not a viable alternative.190  One virtual currency known as Peer-
coin, for example, has an algorithm that allows for the release and retire-
ment of its units depending on demand, as determined by a simple preset 
formula.191  While the Peercoin algorithm is superior to the Bitcoin code 
because it makes some attempt to match supply and demand,192 its rigid 
formula will likely not achieve the desired slight level of inflation in “all 
                                                          
on us, deliberately to sacrifice these to the outworn dogma, which had its value once, of 
£3:17:10½ per ounce.  Advocates of the ancient standard do not observe how remote it 
now is from the spirit and the requirements of the age. 
Id. 
 187.  By limiting the supply of bitcoins, its architects have ensured that the value of a bitcoin 
will increase vis-à-vis other assets—which means that it is inherently deflationary in the sense that 
things will “cost less in terms of Bitcoin” in the future.  Matthew O’Brien, Why Bitcoin Will Never 
Be a Currency—In 2 Charts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2013/12/why-bitcoin-will-never-be-a-currency-in-2-charts/282364/ (emphasis omitted). 
 188.  Mervyn King, The Institutions of Monetary Policy, at i (Nat’l Bureau of Economic Res. 
Working Paper No. 10400, 2004).  
 189.   See supra text accompanying notes 96–98.  That is not to say that everyone agrees with 
this general consensus.  One well-known critic is economist John Taylor, who argues that mone-
tary policy should be based on “a predictable rule-like strategy for the instruments of policy.”  
John B. Taylor, A Monetary Policy for the Future 2 (Apr. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://web.stanford.edu/~johntayl/2015_pdfs/A_Monetary_Policy_For_the_Future-4-15-15.pdf.  
However, the rule that Taylor has developed “provides no guidance about what to do when the 
predicted rate is negative, as has been the case for almost the entire period since the crisis.”  Ben 
S. Bernanke, The Taylor Rule: A Benchmark for Monetary Policy?, BROOKINGS (Apr. 28, 2005), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/2015/04/28-taylor-rule-monetary-policy.  
Instead, monetary policy requires some level of discretion and flexibility to deal with unanticipat-
ed events. 
 190.  King, supra note 188, at i. 
 191.  Frequently Asked Questions, PEERCOIN, http://peercoin.net/faq (last visited May 17, 
2017).  The Peercoin website explains that its money supply is calculated based on: “Proof of 
Work mining (increases supply); Number of transactions (decreases supply by 0.01 PPC per 
transaction); [and] Proof of Stake minting (increases supply at a rate up to 1% per year).”  Id. 
 192.  Id. (“Peercoin inflation rate has consistently remained below 5% for the first half of 
2014.  At the current adoption rate, this rate will decline further over time, making Peercoin less 
inflationary and more sustainable than most other cryptocoins.”). 
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possible future states of the world.”193  Because there is no central bank to 
intervene to correct the supply of Peercoins, in the event that its formula 
mismatches supply and demand and the virtual currency becomes highly 
inflationary or deflationary, people are likely to abandon Peercoin in favor 
of a more reliable form of money. 
III.  BENEFITS AND RISKS OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
Virtual currencies are not an ideal form of money, but they do have 
other positive attributes: much of the enthusiastic discussion of virtual cur-
rencies has focused on their superiority to existing payment systems (par-
ticularly in terms of reducing transaction costs).  This Part will explore 
these benefits of virtual currencies, but will not neglect the systemic risks 
that widely used virtual currencies could pose.  The next Part will then con-
sider how these benefits might best be preserved, while mitigating the risks. 
A.  Benefits of Virtual Currencies 
The Federal Reserve has noted, “[a] safe, efficient, secure and accessi-
ble payment system contributes to a nation’s financial stability and econom-
ic growth.  Payments play a vital role in supporting financial transactions, 
facilitating commerce and enabling the transfer of value between business-
es, consumers and financial institutions.”194  However, the more established 
consumer payment systems that we have, including cash, checks, credit 
cards, and electronic funds transfers,195 leave much to be desired.  This Sec-
tion will explore some of the drawbacks associated with these payment 
methods, and consider how virtual currencies can address some of these 
drawbacks. 
Cash is prized because there is no settlement risk associated with cash 
payments: these payments “involve the simultaneous exchange of a com-
modity and good funds” (sometimes referred to as a “delivery versus pay-
ment” procedure).196  Cash is also prized because it allows for anonymous 
transactions that leave no paper trail.197  However, cash is impractical for 
                                                          
 193.  King, supra note 188, at i. 
 194.  PAYMENTS WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 6. 
 195.  Mark J. Flannery, Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and Discount Window 
Lending, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 804, 812 (1996).  This does not purport to be an ex-
haustive list of types of consumer payment systems, only a discussion of a few common types.  
This Part also does not consider real time gross settlement systems for large payments such as 
FedWire (in the United States) and the TARGET2 System (in Europe), as these typically serve 
only institutional clients. 
 196.  Id. at 808. 
 197.  Andolfatto, supra note 1. 
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making large payments, or for making payments over a distance.198  Checks 
solve these latter problems, but they involve settlement risk—the recipient 
of the check provides the good or service in exchange for the check rather 
than good funds, and so the recipient is effectively extending interim credit 
to the payer until the check clears and the good funds are provided to the 
recipient.199  There is always a risk that the payer will not have sufficient 
funds to honor the check.  Furthermore, depending on how the check is 
cleared, the financial institutions involved in the clearing process may end 
up being exposed to each other’s credit.200  While it is often more efficient 
for such financial institutions to use credit to settle payments (rather than 
requiring ready funds or collateral before settlement can take place),201 reli-
ance on interbank credit during settlement makes a payment system more 
susceptible to shocks and crises.202  If for any reason that credit ceases to 
become available, the entire payment system will seize up.  Similar con-
cerns pertain to the interbank settlement of electronic funds transfers, like 
payroll and bill payments.203 
Credit cards also involve credit risk, but it is the bank that issued the 
card that takes on the risk that the payer has insufficient funds, rather than 
the recipient of funds (the recipient is usually referred to as the “merchant” 
in the credit card context).204  From the merchant’s perspective, credit cards 
reduce settlement risk, but the merchant is required to pay an often opaque 
array of fees to a number of different entities for card processing services.205  
The merchant also bears the risk of chargebacks: if a payer successfully 
disputes a charge, then the merchant’s bank will pull the funds from the 
                                                          
 198.  Flannery, supra note 195, at 812; see also Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and 
Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 600–01 (2015). 
 199.  Flannery, supra note 195, at 812. 
 200.  MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 23 
(2016).  Ricks explains:  
The payer’s bank debits the payer’s account, and the payee’s bank credits the payee’s 
account. . . .  To offset these effects, the payer’s bank delivers [money] to the payee’s 
bank. . . .  It is generally done through electronic systems managed by the Federal Re-
serve, and it is coupled with a system of intraday credit whereby the Fed advances base 
money to deposit banks to enable them to settle payments with other deposit banks 
throughout the day. 
Id.   
 201.  Flannery, supra note 195, at 808. 
 202.  Id. at 804 (“The payment system’s credit component constitutes its (potential) Achilles’ 
heel.”).   
 203.  Id. at 817. 
 204.  Id. at 812; Paul Downs, What You Need to Know About Credit Card Processing, N.Y. 
TIMES: YOU’RE THE BOSS (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/ 
what-you-need-to-know-about-credit-card-processing/?_r=0. 
 205.  Downs, supra note 204.  
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merchant’s account to return to the payer.206  Merchants tend to be charged 
more for processing transactions that are more likely to be the subject of a 
chargeback—particularly transactions done over the phone or internet.207  
These types of transactions are sometimes referred to as “pull” payments,208 
where “the payer supplies his/her account information to the [merchant].  
The [merchant]’s financial institution then pulls the money out of the pay-
er’s account.”209  Merchants often store this information for later use, and 
this stored information is vulnerable to theft.210  “Push” payments are much 
safer, since they require the holder of the funds to take an active step to 
make a payment, and no information is left with the merchant.211 
Virtual currency technologies have the ability to address many of these 
shortcomings.  Unlike cash, virtual currency can be sent securely in large 
amounts and over great distances.  Virtual currency transactions are also 
cheaper than credit card transactions: “[w]hile credit card networks charge 
merchants fees in the range of 3 to 4 percent of the total amount of a trans-
action . . . a Bitcoin transaction can cost less than 1 percent.”212  Payments 
can also be settled quickly using virtual currencies: transactions using 
bitcoins, for example, usually take around ten minutes to process.213  This 
increased speed and efficiency is a result of the most innovative aspect of 
the Bitcoin system: its development of the “blockchain” or “distributed 
ledger.”214  To initiate a transaction, the payer “pushes” the bitcoin to the 
recipient, avoiding the security issues associated with pull payments.215  
The transaction is then processed by miners who look to the distributed 
ledger (which shows all the transactions that have ever been conducted with 
the bitcoin in question) to determine whether the payer is indeed the owner 
of the bitcoin.216  The miners need only look to the one distributed ledger to 
determine this, which allows for quicker verification than if the transaction 
were queued on multiple separately administered ledgers that needed to be 
                                                          
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  PAYMENTS WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 17. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id.; Andreessen, supra note 4. 
 212.  Brito et al., supra note 159, at 151. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Considera-
tion of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 843–44 (2015). 
 215.  Andreessen, supra note 4.  Because the payer takes an active step to send funds to the 
recipient, “the receiver of a payment does not get any information from the sender that can be 
used to steal money from the sender in the future, either by that merchant or by a criminal who 
steals that information from the merchant.”  Id. 
 216.  SWANSON, supra note 26, at 24, 28. 
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reconciled before the transaction could be finalized.217  Avoiding the recon-
ciliation of ledgers administered by different banks also avoids replication 
errors, and the need for any interbank credit to speed up settlement.218  Once 
the transaction is approved, the ledger is updated real-time to reflect the 
transaction and is the definitive word on who now owns the bitcoin.219 
Even a cross-border payment simply involves passing a bitcoin from 
person to person: although a hypothetical French payer would admittedly 
have to convert their euros into bitcoins, and the hypothetical American re-
cipient would have to convert such bitcoins into USD, using Bitcoin is 
much more efficient than a comparable international wire transfer, which 
would have to go through layers of “correspondent banks, exchanges and 
clearing houses.”220  When there are fewer institutions involved in the set-
tlement of the payment, there are fewer links between institutions for sys-
temic shocks to travel along (and when interbank settlement is avoided, no 
credit is extended between banks as part of that settlement process).  No 
credit needs to be extended to the payer either, removing significant risk 
from the payments process.  For all of these reasons, it is easy to understand 
venture capitalist Marc Andreessen’s enthusiasm for Bitcoin: 
 Bitcoin is a digital bearer instrument.  It is a way to exchange 
money or assets between parties with no pre-existing trust: A 
string of numbers is sent over email or text message in the sim-
plest case.  The sender doesn’t need to know or trust the receiver 
or vice versa.  Related, there are no chargebacks—this is the part 
that is literally like cash—if you have the money or the asset, you 
can pay with it; if you don’t, you can’t.  This is brand new.  This 
has never existed in digital form before.221 
But the benefits of using virtual currencies to effect payments on a 
large scale will not come without risk to the financial system.  The next 
Section will explore these risks. 
B.  Systemic Risks Posed by Virtual Currencies 
The type of systemic risks posed by virtual currencies and distributed 
ledger technology will depend on the way, and the extent to which, the cur-
rencies and technology become integrated into our society.  This Section 
will therefore engage in a thought experiment and consider two possible 
                                                          
 217.  Id. 
 218.  For a discussion of credit and settlement, see supra text accompanying notes 205–206. 
 219.  Walch, supra note 214, at 846. 
 220.  John Gapper, Bitcoin Is Far More Than a Currency for Speculators, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 
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scenarios and their attendant systemic risks.  First, this Section will consider 
the systemic risks that might be posed by a decentralized virtual currency 
(be it Bitcoin or otherwise) that is widely adopted by members of the pub-
lic, and thus operates as a type of shadow currency (“Scenario 1”).  Then, 
the second scenario will consider the risks that could arise if systemically 
important financial institutions become significantly exposed to a virtual 
currency (“Scenario 2”).  Importantly, these scenarios are not mutually ex-
clusive—indeed, the proliferation of any virtual currency is most likely if 
the financial industry starts to invest in it (without such demand, it would be 
surprising if virtual currencies were to be sufficiently widely adopted that 
they could cause the macroeconomic problems discussed in Scenario 1).222  
Of course, it is possible that neither of these scenarios will come to pass, 
and that virtual currencies and their associated distributed ledger technolo-
gies will continue to serve only a niche market.  If that is the case, no sys-
temic risk will be posed, but none of the benefits discussed in the previous 
Part will come to fruition either.  Part IV will therefore follow this Section’s 
thought experiments by considering ways of preserving those benefits, 
while minimizing systemic risks. 
1.  Scenario 1: Virtual Currencies as Widely Used Shadow 
Currencies 
In the wake of the Financial Crisis, much attention has been focused 
on “shadow banking”—that is, the part of the financial industry that “per-
forms the same functions as traditional banking, but . . . the regulatory 
structure is light or nonexistent.”223  If a decentralized virtual currency starts 
to become used so widely that it begins to operate as an alternative money, 
it could be considered a new type of shadow banking—as such, the post-
Crisis scholarship on the systemic risks posed by shadow banking will be 
used here as a framework for considering the risks posed by widely adopted 
decentralized virtual currencies.  First, however, it is worth addressing a po-
tential quibble: some might consider the “shadow banking” literature to be 
inappropriate in this context.  Typical discussions of shadow banking focus 
on whether we should regulate non-bank institutions that are providing 
banking-like services224—but a decentralized virtual currency transaction 
                                                          
 222.  See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. 
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can be processed without going through any institutional intermediary.225  
This does not mean, however, that the shadow banking literature is inappo-
site.  An unregulated virtual currency that usurps the role of payment sys-
tems traditionally provided by banks warrants attention as a type of shadow 
banking, even if there are no intermediary institutions involved. 
Payment services have traditionally been provided by banks, and be-
cause these payment services (together with the other traditional banking 
functions of capital intermediation and risk management) are indispensable 
to broader economic growth, banks have always been highly regulated.226  
However, since the 1970s, a significant proportion of banking services has 
migrated outside of the regulated banking sector.227  There were enormous 
disruptions of shadow banking services during the Financial Crisis, and 
such services have since faced heightened scrutiny.228  But Bitcoin did not 
exist when the financial system collapsed in 2008, and thus it is not surpris-
ing that it and other virtual currencies have not formed part of the debate on 
shadow banking that followed the Crisis.  However, if virtual currencies 
start to usurp more and more of traditional banks’ payments functions, then 
a problem with virtual currencies could certainly cause harm to the broader 
financial system and economy—former CFTC commissioner Bart Chilton’s 
reference to Bitcoin as a “shadow currency”229 is therefore very apt. 
Notwithstanding that it is not an ideal store of value and lacks explicit 
government backing, it is possible that the enthusiasm buoying Bitcoin may 
generate sufficient momentum for it to become a widely adopted means of 
exchange, and thus for it to achieve money status.  After all, money is ulti-
mately a social technology, and bitcoins can function as such for as long as 
people believe that others will accept bitcoins as payment.230  Alternatively, 
future iterations of privately issued virtual currencies might be better (alt-
hough by no means perfect)231 stores of value, and might therefore become 
more widely accepted as “money”—at least for a time.  Any “money” status 
achieved by virtual currencies would be particularly vulnerable, though.  If 
a virtual currency were to suddenly lose value as against a sovereign cur-
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rency, it would also lose its utility as a means of exchange232: once pay-
ments could no longer be reliably effected using a virtual currency at a rate 
that matches public expectations, demand for that virtual currency would 
decrease further as people retreated to readily accepted sovereign curren-
cies, further driving down the value of the virtual currency and causing 
more holders to try and get rid of their virtual currency holdings.233  This 
vicious cycle is similar to a bank run,234 and any number of triggers might 
set such a cycle off.235 
For example, a virtual currency might fall prey to the type of specula-
tive attack that sometimes occurs with respect to emerging market curren-
cies.236  Essentially, this would involve speculators taking short positions in 
the virtual currency, hoping to profit by selling borrowed amounts of the 
virtual currency in the expectation that, by the time such loan must be re-
paid, the value of the virtual currency needed to discharge the loan will 
have fallen.  Speculative attacks can drive the value of a currency down, but 
when the subject of a speculative attack is a sovereign currency, the rele-
vant central bank can shore up the value of that sovereign currency by rais-
ing interest rates.237  However, there is no central bank able to perform such 
intervention for a virtual currency, making it more likely that the specula-
tors will profit from driving down its value, which, in turn, provides greater 
incentive to engage in such speculative attacks in the first place. 
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Alternatively, if a bubble were to develop in a particular virtual cur-
rency as an asset class, then the value of that currency would drop precipi-
tously once the bubble popped.238  Or a particularly brazen theft of virtual 
currency might convince holders that the virtual currency (or the infrastruc-
ture built around it) is too vulnerable, and cause them to rapidly dump their 
virtual currency holdings.239  Or civil warfare over the virtual currency’s 
code could undermine confidence in the virtual currency.240  Confidence 
could also be damaged by ponzi schemers or other fraudsters—who already 
seem to be taking advantage of Bitcoin to advance their schemes241—as 
“overoptimistic media coverage of Bitcoin prompts waves of novice inves-
tors to pump up Bitcoin prices.”242  There is no equivalent of deposit insur-
ance in place for virtual currencies to assure users that their funds are pro-
tected, and so it would be entirely rational for holders of the virtual 
currency to make a “prisoner’s dilemma”-type calculation upon hearing 
news of any of these (or other, as yet unimagined) triggering events, and try 
to convert their virtual currency to sovereign currency before everyone else 
does—even though this would result in suboptimal outcomes for all. 
If a failed virtual currency had previously been widely used to effect 
everyday purchases, the resulting payment system failure could impact the 
normal flow of funds in a way that could retard broader economic 
growth.243  Furthermore, the failure of a widely used virtual currency would 
effectively contract the supply of money available in the economy, which 
would also hamper economic growth.244  The usual response of a central 
bank in the face of a contracting money supply is to lower interest rates, but 
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to use Bitcoin on a regular basis, the inherently deflationary nature of Bitcoin could be problemat-
ic for broader economic growth.  Paul Krugman, Editorial, Golden Cyberfetters, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/golden-cyberfetters/.  
Businesses and individuals are often reluctant to spend their money when it is likely to have great-
er purchasing power later on.  Id.  Without a reliable currency to facilitate transactions and pay-
ments, the scope of transacting would be limited to other, potentially geographically constrained 
strategies of exchange.  For a discussion of the consequences of limited amounts of currency in 
the Middle Ages, see Desan, supra note 169, at 377, 396. 
 244.  Ricks, supra note 15, at 106. 
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“a widespread substitution of central bank money by privately issued virtual 
currency could significantly reduce the size of central banks’ balance 
sheets, and thus also their ability to influence the short-term interest 
rates.”245  Central banks would therefore be limited in their ability to re-
spond to a panic regarding a widely used decentralized virtual currency.246 
2.  Scenario 2: Financial Institutions and Virtual Currencies 
The world’s largest financial institutions are often described as “too 
big to fail”: there is an expectation that governments will not permit the 
failure of these large and interconnected entities because such failure would 
cripple the financial system—with macroeconomic consequences.247  De-
spite legislative reforms enacted in the wake of the Financial Crisis, there is 
a general consensus that this “too big to fail” problem persists, which is 
highly problematic from a financial stability perspective.248  Such institu-
tions are incentivized to engage in riskier behavior, knowing that they will 
reap any profits from the risks they take, and benefit from government in-
tervention that will protect them and absorb their losses should those risks 
turn out badly.249  Any development, then, that increases the systemic im-
portance of these large institutions, and confers a competitive advantage 
that will allow them to grow even larger, is unwelcome from a financial 
stability perspective.  The risks associated with widespread use of a virtual 
currency discussed in Scenario 1 will be an order of magnitude more trou-
bling if, as explored in this Scenario 2, large financial institutions were to 
                                                          
 245.  ECB 2012, supra note 37, at 35. 
 246.  Because decentralized virtual currencies are not administered by any institution, there 
would also be no locus for other types of central bank assistance (such as the provision of funds 
through a “lender of last resort” program).  See id. at 38–40. 
 247.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A 
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 7 
(2010, rev. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (“[E]xcessive interconnectedness among 
systemically important banks also [transmits] shocks across the financial system and economy.”); 
see also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE 
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 184 (2010). 
 248.  Simon Johnson, The Myth of The Resolution Authority, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011, 5:00 
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/the-myth-of-resolution-authority/.  Despite 
reforms, there is no real credible alternative to a bail-out or an unwieldy bankruptcy of large fi-
nancial institutions with international operations.  Id.  The continuing lower cost of funding for 
systemically important institutions reflects market support for the view that some institutions re-
main “too big to fail.”  See Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Ex-
pectations of Implicit State Guarantees 20 (May 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656. 
 249.  See William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Re-
quirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365, 1365 (1989) (“If governments and modern nations do not al-
low most banks to [fail], how can the leaders and managements of banking institutions be disci-
plined and avoid unduly risky, negligent, or adventurous lending policies (or simply poor asset-
liability management)?”). 
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become significantly exposed to a virtual currency.  To be clear, the virtual 
currency in question need not be Bitcoin—for the purposes of this thought 
experiment, there are risks if the financial industry starts to develop, or in-
vest heavily in, any virtual currency that is not also a sovereign currency.250 
Financial institutions may wish to invest in virtual currencies purely to 
speculate on their rate of exchange as against sovereign currencies.  Or they 
may wish to invest in them as assets that are expected to appreciate in value 
in the long-term.  In either instance, a dramatic reduction in the value of a 
virtual currency (as outlined in Scenario 1) is likely to have a pernicious 
impact on any financial institution that is heavily exposed to that virtual 
currency.  Presumably there would not be an exact match between the fi-
nancial institution’s virtual currency-denominated holdings and its virtual 
currency-denominated obligations.251  In a panic, the financial institution 
would no longer be able to exchange the virtual currency for sovereign cur-
rencies (at least not at the expected rates)—and widespread attempts to ex-
change the virtual currency would put further downward pressure on its 
value.  Instead, the financial institution would either have to sell other as-
sets to raise the necessary sovereign currencies to discharge its obligations.  
This dynamic mirrors Mishkin’s explanation of how a foreign exchange cri-
sis can precipitate a banking crisis252: if multiple financial institutions are 
similarly situated (which is not unlikely, given that financial institutions 
tend to herd into the same investments),253 then they will all be forced to 
raise sovereign currency at the same time.  If multiple financial institutions 
start to sell their other, non-virtual currency assets to raise sovereign cur-
rency, this will depress the value of those other assets market-wide—a con-
cept Brunnermeier calls a “fire sale externality.”254  Of course, financial in-
stitutions could also try to borrow sovereign currencies to satisfy their 
obligations, but borrowing would likely be difficult given that a financial 
institution with exposure to large amounts of virtual currency would have a 
shrinking balance sheet and would therefore be seen as a high default 
risk.255  Furthermore, the assets that financial institutions might propose to 
                                                          
 250.  For example, Goldman Sachs recently filed a patent for a new virtual currency called 
SETLCoin.  Ian Kar, Goldman Sachs Wants to Create Its Own Version of Bitcoin, QUARTZ (Dec. 
2, 2015), http://qz.com/563967/goldman-sachs-wants-to-create-its-own-version-of-bitcoin/. 
 251.  If the virtual currency is being held by the financial institution as an asset in expectation 
of appreciation, the institution would be holding more of the virtual currency than it needs to satis-
fy its obligations denominated in that virtual currency.   
 252.  Mishkin, supra note 18, at 1523–24. 
 253.  Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 327 (2011). 
 254.  Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 77, 94 (2009). 
 255.  Mishkin, supra note 18, at 1523–24. 
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use as collateral for the loans will be less valuable in a fire sale environ-
ment, further limiting their ability to borrow.256 
Additional concerns arise if financial institutions, rather than purchas-
ing virtual currencies directly, devise new and indirect ways of gaining ex-
posure to those assets—the number and complexity of transmission mecha-
nisms between those virtual currencies and the rest of the financial system 
could increase as a result.  For example, SecondMarket has already devel-
oped a mutual fund known as the Bitcoin Investment Trust, which is “an 
open-ended trust that is invested exclusively in bitcoin.”257  TeraExchange 
has developed (and the CFTC has approved) swap contracts that reference 
bitcoins.258  Because an institution is not required to own a unit of virtual 
currency in order to enter into a swap contract that references that virtual 
currency,259 financial institutions that are not comfortable investing in virtu-
al currencies directly will be able to use this more familiar derivative format 
to gain exposure to them.  Swaps therefore allow for broader, synthetic ex-
posure to virtual currencies, potentially magnifying the impact of a change 
in the value of a unit of such virtual currency.260 
A worst-case scenario, from a financial stability perspective, would 
involve financial institutions using virtual currencies as collateral for inter-
bank repo agreements, which would make such virtual currencies integral to 
the interbank funding process.261  If the virtual currency were, for any rea-
son, to cease to constitute acceptable collateral for repo agreements (per-
haps as a result of one of the possible trigger events discussed in Scenario 
1), this could quickly damage financial stability.  There is already a maturi-
ty mismatch between a financial institution’s long-term assets and short-
term repo funding—and if the institution becomes unable to renew its short-
term funding for some reason, this can result in a liquidity crunch.262  This 
vulnerability to liquidity crunches becomes heightened when there is also a 
                                                          
 256.  Gorton & Metrick, supra note 223, at 279. 
 257.  Frequently Asked Questions, GRAYSCALE, https://grayscale.co/faq/ (last visited May 17, 
2017). 
 258.  Douwe Miedema, Bitcoin Gets Boost as Watchdog Approves First Swap, REUTERS, Sept. 
12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-bitcoin-cftc-idUSKBN0H71FU20140912 (“The 
swap locks in the dollar value of a given bitcoin amount, and the difference is settled in dollars 
when the contract expires.”). 
 259.  See John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle 
(Dec. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
testimony/2010-0226-Geanakoplos.pdf.  The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was an inde-
pendent commission created by statute to examine the causes of the Financial Crisis.  See History 
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visited May 17, 2017). 
 260.  Geanakoplos, supra note 259. 
 261.  See supra text accompanying notes 86–91 (discussing the repo markets and their failure 
during the Financial Crisis).  
 262.  Allen, supra note 87, at 145–46. 
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currency mismatch, and no working market mechanism to convert that cur-
rency.263  As a result, institutions that rely heavily on virtual currency-
backed repo agreements could quickly find themselves starved of short-
term funding, imperiling their liquidity, and then their solvency, in short or-
der.264  If this were to happen on a systemic scale, then interbank lending 
would seize up entirely because of a general lack of confidence in financial 
institutions and their collateral—and if interbank lending seizes up, then the 
flow of credit to the economy at large will also seize.265 
If such an eventuality were threatened, government intervention might 
be required in the form of bailouts or liquidity assistance for institutions 
with significant exposure to the virtual currency (ironically, then, the virtual 
currency will have invited the very state intervention that the developers of 
those currencies were so pointedly trying to avoid).266  If the experience of 
2008 is anything to go by, such intervention would most likely take the 
form of emergency swap lines between central banks and the largest finan-
cial institutions, pursuant to which the central bank would provide the more 
liquid, sovereign-backed currency in exchange for the troubled virtual cur-
rency267 (smaller institutions are more likely to be permitted to fail268).  
Such swap agreements would address the liquidity crunches experienced by 
financial institutions, but they would also expose the central bank to the risk 
that such institutions might be unable to return sovereign currency to the 
central bank at the conclusion of the swap agreement, thus permanently 
saddling the central bank with worthless virtual currency. 
Admittedly, at present, the thought of virtual currencies serving as col-
lateral for repo transactions seems farfetched.  Typically, “safe” assets like 
government obligations serve as collateral for these types of transactions.269  
Virtual currencies would certainly not be “safe” in this sense.  After all, a 
unit of virtual currency, as an asset, does not represent a direct claim on any 
                                                          
 263.  Baker, supra note 33, at 615–16.   
 264.  Ricks, supra note 15, at 77, 91. 
 265.  Allen, supra note 87, at 146–47. 
 266.  See supra note 154 and accompanying text.  
 267.  Baker, supra note 33, at 621–22.  In 2008, the Federal Reserve made USD available to 
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gations.  Id.  Those institutions faced severe liquidity crunches once their usual ways of borrowing 
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holdings in order to discharge its USD-denominated obligations would.  Id. at 613.  
 268.  Bank Failures in Brief: 2009, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/ 
bank/2009/index.html (last visited May 17, 2017).  In 2009, for example, there were 140 small 
bank failures.  Id.  
 269.  Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act and a Little Known Corner of Wall Street: The Repo Market, NYU STERN (July 16, 
2010, 6:22 PM), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/07/the-doddfrank-wall-
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other person (government or otherwise).  A virtual currency gains value 
purely from the expectation that others will also value it.270  However, insti-
tutional demand for reliably priced assets that can serve as collateral for 
cheap short-term funding has spurred the growth of other less-than-reliable 
asset classes (such as mortgage-backed securities) in the past,271 and may do 
so again in the future.  It is possible that through ubiquity and standardiza-
tion, the volatility of a virtual currency might be sufficiently moderated 
such that it comes to be seen as a sufficiently reliable store of value that can 
serve as collateral for repo transactions—the same unit of virtual currency 
can then be re-pledged (potentially ad infinitum), and in this way, become a 
systemically important means of exchange amongst financial institutions.272 
One way to reduce the volatility of the price of a virtual currency 
would be for it to achieve a high level of acceptance for retail transac-
tions—there would then be a deep market for it, and liquidity is generally 
considered a characteristic of “safe” assets.273  Large financial institutions 
might therefore develop, and lend their reputations to, a virtual currency, in 
order to encourage others to use that virtual currency as a transaction mech-
anism (and in doing so, make Scenario 1 more likely).274  They might also 
use their considerable lobbying power to seek to align the U.S. tax treat-
ment of virtual currencies with the position in the European Union in order 
to improve the ability of virtual currencies to act as a transaction mecha-
nism.275  Financial institutions seeking to promote their virtual currency 
might even go a step further and fix the exchange rate of the virtual curren-
cy to that of a sovereign currency, like the USD (a practice often referred to 
as “pegging”276).  This would certainly ensure a more stable value for the 
                                                          
 270.  Krugman, supra note 17.  
 271.  Gorton & Metrick, supra note 223, at 275. 
 272.  See Gorton, supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 273.  Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 374 
(2016). 
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Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
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virtual currency, making it look more like an attractive “safe” asset—at 
least until the financial institutions administering the virtual currency be-
came unable to maintain sufficient reserves of the sovereign currency to 
sustain the peg.277  Depegging the exchange rate of the virtual currency 
from that of a sovereign currency would inevitably invite panic about the 
value of the virtual currency, causing it to lose any status as a “safe” asset. 
Even putting aside the fragility that would result from using virtual 
currencies as collateral for interbank repo transactions, it would be an un-
welcome development if virtual currencies created and administered by 
“too big to fail” institutions came to dominate everyday transactions.  By 
controlling access to such virtual currencies, these financial institutions 
could crowd out smaller institutions from the payments sphere.278  Further-
more, being the primary suppliers of an instrument regularly used by the 
broader populace to carry out transactions would only increase the already 
considerable political clout of the largest financial institutions.  For exam-
ple, when persons who regularly transact in the virtual currency are ready to 
pay their taxes, they would need to convert their funds into a sovereign cur-
rency.  To the extent that financial institutions control the rate at which the 
virtual currency could be converted into the sovereign currency and vice 
versa, this would allow financial institutions to dictate the amount of money 
allowed to circulate, and circumscribe the ability of the central bank to con-
duct monetary policy.279  National governments would become increasingly 
beholden to these financial institutions as a result; notwithstanding any de-
sire to improve payment systems using virtual currency technologies, such 
eventualities should be avoided. 
IV.  A FINANCIAL STABILITY-ORIENTED APPROACH TO VIRTUAL 
CURRENCIES AND PAYMENTS INNOVATION 
A.  Current Approaches to Regulation of Virtual Currencies 
The previous Part discussed the improvements that virtual currencies 
could make to the processing of payments.  However, for those improve-
ments to have a significant impact, virtual currencies would need to be 
widely used.  On that scale, virtual currencies could become a shadow cur-
rency that could threaten financial stability.  The systemic risks posed by 
virtual currencies have not been the focus of regulatory efforts to date, 
                                                          
 277.  In discussing countries that seek to fix their exchange rate by pegging the value of their 
currency to that of a foreign country, the IMF has noted that those “committed to supplying or 
redeeming its monetary liabilities at a fixed exchange rate . . . implies that it must hold foreign 
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 278.  See infra Part IV.   
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though.  Instead, most of the regulatory focus on virtual currencies has been 
concerned with their ability to facilitate money laundering and criminal ac-
tivities, and to defraud or otherwise harm consumers. 
Money laundering and the facilitation of criminal activity are perhaps 
foremost amongst these concerns.  The Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”), an international body that promulgates standards for avoiding 
money-laundering and terrorist financing, has raised a number of concerns 
about virtual currencies, including that many virtual currency protocols do 
not require or provide any identification of their participants and thus can be 
used to facilitate anonymous transactions for criminals and terrorists.280  
The FATF is also concerned about the decentralized nature of many virtual 
currencies, which ensures that there is no central administrator who can be 
targeted for investigation.281  In addition to concerns about criminal activity, 
consumer protection issues loom large in debates over virtual currencies: 
fraudsters seem to be taking advantage of the buzz over Bitcoin to swindle 
novice investors.282  Even in the absence of fraud, consumers using Bitcoin 
need to be aware of its high volatility and susceptibility to theft.283 
Because the decentralized nature of virtual currencies ensures that such 
currencies have no operators to regulate, much of the regulatory action to 
date has taken the form of warnings to users.  In Europe, warnings have 
been issued by German, French, Dutch, and Belgian authorities about the 
volatility of unregulated virtual currencies, and possible cybersecurity is-
sues that may affect users of such virtual currencies.284  In the United States, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Financial Industries 
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) have all issued warnings to investors about the risks in-
herent in virtual currency investments.285  In addition to these warnings, the 
SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have also 
brought some Bitcoin-related enforcement actions, but these enforcement 
                                                          
 280.  Financial Action Task Force, supra note 28, at 9.  
 281.  Id. at 10 (noting that transactions consummated with the virtual currency “may seem to 
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actions are responding to problems with virtual currencies after they have 
occurred.286 
To date, the most high profile attempts at proactive regulation of virtu-
al currencies have come from FinCEN and the New York Department of 
Financial Services (“NYDFS”).  One of the most challenging aspects for 
both of these regulatory agencies has been identifying the persons who 
should be regulated.  In March of 2013, FinCEN issued guidance on the ap-
plication of Bank Secrecy Act regulations to virtual currencies.287  In that 
guidance, FinCEN determined that exchangers288 and administrators289 of 
virtual currencies are “money services businesses” who are therefore re-
quired to register and comply with FinCEN’s anti-money laundering regula-
tions.290  Users (including miners) who obtain the virtual currency for the 
purpose of purchasing goods and services, are not.291  In June 2015, the 
NYDFS finalized rules for virtual currency operations.292  Although the 
rules are colloquially known as the “BitLicense,” these rules apply to virtu-
al currencies generally.293  The BitLicense requires registration and supervi-
sion of anyone carrying out a “Virtual Currency Business Activity,”294 
which is defined to include: 
(1) receiving virtual currency for transmission or transmitting vir-
tual currency, except where the transaction is undertaken for non-
financial purposes and does not involve the transfer of more than 
a nominal amount of virtual currency; (2) storing, holding, or 
maintaining custody or control of virtual currency on behalf of 
others; (3) buying and selling virtual currency as a customer 
business; (4) performing exchange services as a customer busi-
                                                          
 286.  See, e.g., Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Settles with Te-
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ness; or (5) controlling, administering or issuing a virtual curren-
cy.295 
At this stage, it is not particularly clear which businesses would fit 
within these categories, but in its analysis of the BitLicense, law firm Davis 
Polk has suggested that regulated businesses would include exchanges, 
dealers, providers of wallets, and processors of payments (and may also in-
clude mutual funds that invest in virtual currencies).296  Importantly, 
though, most consumers and merchants will not be regulated by the Bit-
License.297 
Any person required to register for a BitLicense is required to imple-
ment consumer protection measures,298 establish requirements for custody 
and protection of customer assets,299 and develop comprehensive cybersecu-
rity and anti-money laundering programs.300  The one provision of the Bit-
License that relates directly to financial stability concerns is Section 200.8, 
which requires supervised entities to “maintain at all times such capital in 
an amount and form as the superintendent determines is sufficient to ensure 
the financial integrity of the [supervised entity] and its ongoing operations 
based on an assessment of the specific risks applicable to each [supervised 
entity].”301  Capital requirements are intended to create a “cushion” of liq-
uid funds at an institution so that it is better able to absorb losses and will 
therefore be less likely to fail or require public support—or to contaminate 
other institutions that have exposure to it.302  The BitLicense capital re-
quirement set out in Section 200.8 could potentially limit contagion from 
the failure of a virtual currency-related business, but it is highly discretion-
ary—much more discretionary than the capital requirements for banks.303  
Depending on how it is applied, the BitLicense capital requirement may 
turn out to be insufficient to prevent failure of the businesses involved.  
                                                          
 295.  Id. § 200.2(q). 
 296.  DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, NEW YORK’S FINAL “BITLICENSE” RULE: OVERVIEW 
AND CHANGES FROM JULY 2014 PROPOSAL 11–19 (2015).   
 297.  Id. at 2.  
 298.  R. & REGS. tit. 23 §§ 200.18; 200.19; 200.20.  Consumer protection measures include 
disclosures relating to risk and rules on advertising, as well as including anti-fraud provisions and 
complaints procedures.  See id.  
 299.  Id. § 200.9. 
 300.  Id. §§ 200.12(a), 200.15, 200.16, 200.17. 
 301.  Id. § 200.8. 
 302.  Allen, supra note 87, at 129, 132. 
 303.  For a discussion of these requirements, see id. at 127–33.  Capital regulations such as 
Section 200.8 of the BitLicense will be administered by state regulators, and state regulators have 
been criticized as having a limited jurisdictional perspective that renders them ill-equipped to deal 
with systemic risks that exist at a national or international level.  See Brief for Scholars of Insur-
ance Regulation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, Civil Action No. 15-45 (RMC), 2015 WL 
3422512, at *1 (D.D.C. May 22, 2015). 
 924 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:877 
 
Other than this one capital provision, the focus of the BitLicense is clearly 
on crime and investor protection, rather than on financial stability. 
In addition to the BitLicense, other attempts at direct ex ante regula-
tion of virtual currencies may be forthcoming in the United States.  In par-
ticular, virtual currencies may be proactively regulated as securities or 
commodities.304  The SEC has indicated that, depending on the facts and 
circumstances, it may regulate virtual currencies as securities in some situa-
tions.305  The CFTC has also ruled that Bitcoin is a “commodity,” as defined 
in the Commodity Exchange Act, and thus falls within its jurisdiction.306  It 
is also possible that the CFPB could determine that certain virtual curren-
cies fall within the definition of “consumer financial products and services,” 
and are thus within its purview.307  However, not one of these three agencies 
has a clear mandate to monitor virtual currencies (or any other financial in-
strument for that matter) from a financial stability perspective.308 
B.  Financial Stability-Oriented Approaches to Virtual Currency 
Regulation 
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) is the only United 
States agency with a mandate to “identify gaps in regulation that could pose 
risks to the financial stability of the United States”309 and to “respond to 
emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system.”310  In its 2015 
Annual Report, the FSOC mentioned virtual currencies, noting that: 
At this time, digital currencies do not appear to pose financial 
stability concerns, as the extent to which digital currencies are 
used is extremely small, and their connection to the broader fi-
nancial system is limited.  Nonetheless, the potential applications 
and uses of the peer-to-peer network for transferring value in the 
                                                          
 304.  Brito et al., supra note 159, at 155. 
 305.  Letter from Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC, to Sen. Thomas R. Carper, Chairman, 
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 309.  Dodd-Frank Act § 112, 125 Stat. at 1394. 
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http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/2015%20FSOC%20Annual% 
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payment and financial service industry warrant continued moni-
toring.311 
It is heartening that the FSOC is keeping an eye on potential systemic 
risks posed by virtual currencies; however, if it does detect any such risks, 
the FSOC faces severe structural limitations on its ability to actually re-
spond to such risks.312  The FSOC is, in the end, only a council of regulators 
rather than a regulatory body with its own substantial staff and budget—as 
a result, any meaningful response to systemic risks posed by virtual curren-
cies will need to come from one of the financial regulatory agencies repre-
sented on the FSOC.313 
The Federal Reserve is currently the most proactive member of the 
FSOC when it comes to threats to the stability of the financial system as a 
whole.314  It also has the authority under Section 805 of Dodd-Frank to reg-
ulate systemically important payment systems.315  The Federal Reserve 
therefore seems the best candidate to respond to any threats posed by virtual 
currencies, but Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen has said on record: 
Bitcoin is a payment innovation that’s taking place outside the 
banking industry.  To the best of my knowledge there’s no inter-
section at all, in any way, between Bitcoin and banks that the 
Federal Reserve has the ability to supervise and regulate.  So the 
Fed doesn’t have authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in any 
way.316 
There is a real possibility then, that there will be no official United 
States response to the systemic risks that arise with respect to virtual cur-
rencies.317  Turning to Europe, although the ECB is currently monitoring the 
systemic risks posed by virtual currencies,318 it is not at all clear that it 
would have any legal authority to take regulatory action with respect to 
                                                          
 311.  FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 310, at 114. 
 312.  Allen, supra note 308, at 1120–38. 
 313.  Id. at 1120. 
 314.  Id. at 1121–22. 
 315.  Dodd-Frank Act § 805, 124 Stat. at 1809. 
 316.  Brito et al., supra note 159, at 181. 
 317.  Even though the Federal Reserve has no mandate to regulate virtual currencies, members 
of the public do not pay attention to the niceties of a central bank’s jurisdictional boundaries—in 
the public’s eyes, the central bank is likely to bear responsibility for any systemic crash.  A failure 
of a widely used virtual currency could imperil confidence in the central bank, which could ad-
versely affect its ability to govern the more traditional money supply and payment systems, as the 
ability of central banks to effect policy is in part contingent upon the trust and confidence that the 
market reposes in the institution itself.  See Holmes, supra note 100, at 38. 
 318.  ECB 2012, supra note 37, at 37, 40; ECB 2015, supra note 45, at 4. 
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those systemic risks.319 There are, however, other bodies in the European 
Union (at the national and supranational level) that do have a financial sta-
bility mandate, and they may choose to take up the issue of systemic risk 
posed by virtual currencies.320 
Putting aside issues of regulatory authority, the remainder of this Part 
will consider the form that financial stability-oriented regulation of virtual 
currencies might take.  In some ways, it might be superficially appealing to 
embrace virtual currencies—after all, much of the post-Financial Crisis 
scholarship on financial stability laments the existence of systemically im-
portant (or, more colloquially, “too big to fail”) financial institutions, which 
are so large and interconnected that their failure threatens to drag the entire 
financial system into chaos.321  In principle, no financial institution, let 
alone any institution that is “too big to fail,” need be involved in the pay-
ments effected by virtual currencies,322 so virtual currencies might appear at 
first blush to reduce systemic risk.  However, as this Article has explored, a 
widely used decentralized virtual currency would not be benign from a fi-
nancial stability perspective, particularly because a number of linkages be-
tween virtual currencies and traditional financial institutions are develop-
ing.323  Furthermore, we cannot expect virtual currencies to self-regulate to 
avoid systemic risk.  There is little incentive for any developer of a virtual 
currency to even think about the instability that such currency could cause 
because financial stability is a benefit that accrues to society as a whole, and 
                                                          
 319.  Although the ECB seems to have been more aggressive in pursuing financial stability 
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 321.  See, e.g., JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 247, at 214–17; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Reforming 
Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 707, 707 
(2010). 
 322.  Plassaras, supra note 170, at 379.  
 323.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 2017] $=€=BITCOIN? 927 
 
therefore neither the developer nor users of the currency can profit from 
generating it.324  Even assuming that such individuals did altruistically wish 
to avoid harming financial stability, they would be unable to do so without 
a broader understanding of, and significant information about, all the other 
moving parts in the financial system.325 
It is for these reasons that we need regulation to address financial sta-
bility.  Regulating to minimize systemic risks in a highly complex financial 
system, however, is difficult at the best of times.326  This problem is com-
pounded when dealing with the systemic risks posed by virtual currencies 
because of the decentralized nature of such currencies: as with the anti-
money laundering and anti-fraud regulation discussed in the previous Part, 
it can be difficult to identify the entities to be regulated.327  Even the most 
innovative approaches to dealing with the systemic risks posed by shadow 
banking tend to focus on the institutions that are providing the shadow 
banking services,328 but there are no obvious institutional candidates for 
regulation in the context of a decentralized virtual currency. 
To the extent that we are concerned about problems with a decentral-
ized virtual currency contaminating the more traditional financial industry 
(as explored in Scenario 2), then regulation could focus on members of that 
traditional financial industry.  It would be worthwhile, as the European 
Banker’s Association has recommended, to implement policies that dis-
courage financial institutions from trading and holding virtual currencies.329  
Such policies might include requiring financial institutions to hold high lev-
els of capital against their direct and indirect virtual currency exposures,330 
or prohibiting financial institutions from issuing obligations denominated in 
virtual currencies.331  Alternatively, there could be a prudential requirement 
mandating that banks match their virtual currency liabilities with a stock of 
virtual currency assets.332  However, if a decentralized virtual currency were 
to become widely used, its failure would have ramifications independent of 
any impact on financial institutions (as discussed in Scenario 1), so the 
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measures discussed in this paragraph, while important, might not be suffi-
cient. 
To help address the concerns raised in both Scenarios 1 and 2, regula-
tors could also give thought in advance to the type of emergency measures 
that might need to be deployed in the event that a widely used virtual cur-
rency system does experience a crisis.  The decentralized nature of virtual 
currencies does not mean that the systemic risks they pose have disap-
peared, only that such risks have become so dispersed that it is difficult for 
ex ante regulation to address them.  The result is likely to be an increased 
need for ex post intervention,333 and it would be preferable if the interven-
tion plan were well thought-out, rather than a messy, ad hoc plan developed 
in the heat of a crisis.  However, purely ex post solutions are often costly, as 
well as limited in their efficacy.334 
To avoid these eventualities, but nonetheless encourage the improve-
ment of payments infrastructure, the ideal approach would be for decentral-
ized virtual currencies to be marginalized, but for distributed ledger tech-
nology to be developed for use in conjunction with payments denominated 
in sovereign currencies.  In other words, the goal is to find a way to cabin 
the provision of payment services within the regulated financial industry, so 
that they can be regulated ex ante.  One way to try to achieve this would be 
to ban virtual currencies.335  While it would be highly impractical and pro-
hibitively expensive to enforce such a ban against the users of a virtual cur-
rency,336 it might perhaps be more feasible to target ancillary services that 
facilitate the use of the virtual currency (a whole infrastructure of Bitcoin-
related services has flourished in recent years, including Bitcoin exchanges, 
online wallets, and Bitcoin ATMs).337  Internet service providers could per-
haps be pressured to block websites used to transact in virtual curren-
cies338—although, admittedly, blocking websites is like playing “whack-a-
mole,” and new ones will likely spring up.339  The banning jurisdiction’s 
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courts could also refuse to enforce any contract denominated in a virtual 
currency, and treating virtual currencies as property from a tax perspective 
would also put a damper on the use of such virtual currencies. Ultimately, 
however, the law is limited in its ability to constrain the development of 
privately issued money if individuals remain willing to forgo state-
sponsored enforcement mechanisms for their transactions—and such a 
blunt ban on virtual currencies could stifle important innovations in pay-
ments (and other) technologies.340 
If, as this Article argues, it is better for the bulk of payments to be de-
nominated in sovereign currencies and effected by regulated financial insti-
tutions, then the surest way to achieve this is for financial institutions to 
outcompete the virtual currencies by providing a better service.341  The re-
mainder of this Article will therefore consider possibilities for encouraging 
payments innovation within the regulated financial industry and addressing 
the concerns raised in Scenarios 1 and 2 while nonetheless avoiding an in-
crease in the systemic importance of the largest financial institutions. 
C.  Payments Innovation in the Regulated Financial Industry 
The distributed ledger technology developed in conjunction with virtu-
al currencies does not need to be attached to a virtual currency.  Instead, a 
regulated distributed ledger could be created to record transfers of digitized 
versions of sovereign currency, and regulated institutions (rather than min-
ers) could verify transactions on that ledger.342  At the outset, it should be 
acknowledged that such a ledger would likely become a target for cyberat-
tacks.  But the threat of cyberterrorism is not unique to virtual currencies or 
distributed ledgers—it is a concern common to all payment systems (in-
deed, all electronic infrastructures), and needs to be addressed with funds 
and intelligence at the federal and international level.343  A discussion of the 
best way to protect key infrastructure from cyberterrorism is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Returning, then, to the benefits of a regulated distrib-
uted ledger, tax complications,344 as well as difficulties under the Uniform 
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Commercial Code,345 would be avoided by processing payments denomi-
nated in sovereign currencies, rather than in virtual currencies.  More im-
portantly (from this Article’s perspective), the systemic risk concerns raised 
in Scenarios 1 and 2 would not apply to transactions involving electronic 
versions of sovereign currencies. 
Furthermore, denominating entries on a distributed ledger in sovereign 
currency would be more efficient than using virtual currencies: while 
Bitcoin may be cheaper than traditional payment methods, transaction costs 
could be reduced further by eliminating costs for converting bitcoins to 
sovereign currency.  At present, “[t]he exchange fee [from Bitcoin to sover-
eign currency] falls with the size of the transaction, ranging from 0.5% for 
small transactions down to 0.2% for large transactions,”346  but conversions 
from, say, USD to Bitcoin to USD would be eliminated with USD-
denominated entries on the distributed ledger.  Settlement risk for same-
currency transactions would also be avoided. 
The verification method for transactions could also be made more effi-
cient: currently, the Bitcoin network uses validators known as miners to ap-
prove transactions.  In theory, anyone can become a Bitcoin miner, and the 
Bitcoin system therefore requires complex proof-of-work before a miner 
can verify transactions.347  The time and expense involved in completing 
this proof-of-work is intended to prevent “bad” miners from taking over the 
blockchain in a so-called “51% attack,”348 because if such bad miners were 
to succeed, they could engage in nefarious actions like allowing double 
spending, or “forking” the ledger.349  The proof-of-work process is there-
fore, by design, enormously wasteful and inefficient—if it were not, it 
would be too easy for miners to guess the answer to the proof-of-work and 
the distributed ledger would be vulnerable to bad actors.350  Even given the 
resources involved, though, the Bitcoin proof-of-work requirement may not 
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succeed in its goal of preventing a 51% attack.  Although the code used in 
the Bitcoin system is open-source,351 it is beyond the comprehension of 
most people.  Given the sophisticated understanding of computer program-
ming required, as well as the volume of computer power necessary to verify 
transactions, it should not be surprising that there are a select few perform-
ing the role of Bitcoin miners.352  Increasingly, miners are working together 
in pools, making the prospect of a 51% attack much more than theoreti-
cal.353  There is also the possibility that, at some point in the future, miners 
might simply give up verifying transactions if they feel they are no longer 
being properly compensated (which might happen once new bitcoins cease 
to be released).354  It is questionable, then, whether Bitcoin can live up to its 
claim that “[n]o organization or individual can control Bitcoin, and the net-
work remains secure even if not all of its users can be trusted.”355  In the fu-
ture, some level of trust in the validators may be required.356 
If trust in the validators will be required, it makes sense to use known, 
pre-authorized entities (like regulated financial institutions) to act in that 
capacity.  If trusted validators were used, then time- and energy-consuming 
“proof-of-work” could be dispensed with, and payments processing would 
be cheaper and quicker (settlement could potentially occur in seconds, ra-
ther than the 10 minute average for Bitcoin).357  Because the pre-authorized 
verifiers would have the power to refuse to include a transaction on the 
ledger, they could block suspicious transactions, which would assuage some 
of the money-laundering concerns that have been raised regarding 
Bitcoin.358  Finally, there would also be some general societal benefits from 
dispensing with proof-of-work.  For one, the enormous amount of electrici-
ty and computer power expended in Bitcoin’s verification process would no 
longer be required, which is salutary from an environmental perspective.359  
There is also anecdotal evidence of Bitcoin miners hacking into others’ 
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computer systems in order to access the power necessary to verify transac-
tions—this too would be avoided if verification of transactions on the dis-
tributed ledger were instead to be performed by known and trusted enti-
ties.360  While it is true that institutions would require fees for verifying 
transactions on a regulated distributed ledger, and resources would need to 
be expended on regulating those institutions,361 it is by no means clear that 
Bitcoin miners will not also start to charge transaction processing fees once 
new bitcoins cease to be released.362 
Admittedly, the anonymity associated with Bitcoin and some other vir-
tual currencies would be sacrificed if payments were processed by regulated 
institutions: no anonymity would be tolerated in a payment that is processed 
by an institution subject to anti-money laundering regulation.363  It is worth 
noting, though, that the benefits of anonymity associated with Bitcoin have 
been overstated: “researchers have found that, using sophisticated computer 
analysis, transactions involving large quantities of Bitcoin can be tracked 
and [they] claim that if paired with current law enforcement tools it would 
be possible to gain a lot of information on the persons moving the 
Bitcoins.”364  Furthermore, Bitcoin users are increasingly using services like 
Bitcoin wallets to store and access their bitcoins, and as the providers of 
these services come to be regulated by laws like the BitLicense, they will be 
required to identify those using their services.365  For these reasons, Bitcoin 
transactions are not truly anonymous (as a cash transaction would be). 
If all aspirations to anonymity were abandoned, regulated banks could 
verify transactions effected in sovereign currencies, by pre-identified cus-
tomers, on a distributed ledger.366  These banks could run an algorithm that 
would compare the proposed transaction to the existing entries on the ledger 
to ensure that the person purporting to transfer funds is, indeed, the owner 
of those funds and has not already attempted to send them elsewhere.  If 
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everything is in order, the new transaction would be recorded on the dis-
tributed ledger, quickly achieving settlement finality.  Regulated banks al-
ready have established reputations and experience dealing with customers, 
and they are subject to prudential and consumer protection laws.367  Regu-
lated banks also have access to deposit insurance.368  These attributes 
“should contribute to the confidence among users—whether consumers or 
businesses—that their stored value is safe and that their transactions will be 
executed as expected,”369 making payment services provided by these regu-
lated banks much more appealing to consumers who are wary of virtual cur-
rency payment services. 
This idea of using distributed ledger technology to effect payments in 
sovereign currencies has already gained significant traction.  For example, 
R3 CEV, a “consortium backed by some of the world’s largest banks,” is 
looking to develop a blockchain to, in its words, “revolutionize the financial 
services industry.”370  Similarly, there are rumors that the members of The 
Clearing House (“which acts as the trade group for the nation’s largest 
commercial banks”)371 are “putting together a ‘proof of concept’ for a de-
centralized ledger, or blockchain, that would run on the computers of all the 
participating banks.”372  However, there are serious concerns associated 
with concentrating essential market infrastructure like the distributed ledger 
in the hands of the largest banks. 
A distributed ledger is the type of infrastructure that works best when 
not fragmented; it displays network effects in the sense that its “value in-
creases if there are more users of the enterprise.”373  The first distributed 
ledger that is widely used by financial institutions is therefore likely to have 
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a natural monopoly,374 which “may become a bottleneck facility by which 
the facility’s owners can strengthen their hand in the downstream market by 
constricting access of the owners’ competitors to the bottleneck itself.”375  If 
a consortium of the largest banks is the first mover in developing a main-
stream distributed ledger, and it excludes smaller banks from accessing that 
distributed ledger (or charges them large fees for access), smaller banks 
may be limited in their ability to effect payments for their customers and 
could become obsolete as a result.  This would lead to even greater concen-
tration of banking services in systemically important banks, and could po-
tentially harm the small- and medium-sized enterprises that tend to rely on 
smaller banks for financing.376  Furthermore, if the largest banks hosted the 
distributed ledger on their servers, and were integral to processing everyday 
transactions, their “too big to fail” status (and their political power) would 
be cemented further. 
In some countries, antitrust law might provide a solution to this prob-
lem, but United States’ antitrust law does not provide any clear guidance as 
to whether, and on what terms, the operators of a distributed ledger would 
be required to grant smaller banks access to such important market infra-
structure.377  Therefore, large, systemically important financial institutions 
should not be permitted to operate the predominant distributed ledger in the 
first place.  Nor should the distributed ledger be operated by a not-for-profit 
association of financial institutions, like the National Automated Clearing 
House Association (“NACHA”) that currently administers the widely used 
ACH payments clearing network.  As a result of NACHA’s complicated 
governance structure,378 the largest financial institutions have significant 
clout in determining the way NACHA operates.  For example, although 
NACHA’s membership recently approved changes to the body’s rules that 
would allow for same-day settlement of payments,379 a previous attempt to 
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do so was blocked in 2013 by The Clearing House.380  It has been suggested 
that The Clearing House opposed the upgrade, notwithstanding that smaller 
banks were overwhelmingly in favor of the changes,381 “in part because it 
would have jeopardized the fees they earn from wire transfers.”382 
The influence of the largest financial institutions on the operation of 
the distributed ledger would be reduced if the distributed ledger were in-
stead hosted and administered by the central bank.383  The Federal Reserve 
Banks, for example, which currently serve as an automated clearinghouse, 
“receive files of [automated clearinghouse] payments from originating de-
pository financial institutions, edit and sort the payments, deliver the pay-
ments to receiving depository financial institutions, and settle the payments 
by crediting and debiting the depository financial institutions’ settlement 
accounts.”384  It is therefore not too much of a stretch to conceptualize the 
Federal Reserve Banks administering a distributed ledger on which transac-
tions using USD-denominated tokens could be recorded.385  It is true that 
central banks are not necessarily known for their technological savvy and 
efficiency, but this Article is simply arguing that central banks should host 
the underlying infrastructure for the distributed ledger.  The distributed 
ledger could then be used as a foundation for innovation by regulated finan-
cial institutions. 
While a distributed ledger is most efficient if not fragmented (and thus 
there would ideally be no competition in terms of providing the distributed 
ledger itself), multiple financial institutions could compete in developing 
quicker, more secure, and more cost-effective protocols to verify and exe-
cute transactions on the ledger, whilst still benefitting from the ledger’s 
network effects.  For example, banks could compete to provide trusted and 
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secure wallet services for the bits of data that represent the customer’s sov-
ereign currency.  These wallets would be the next generation of deposit ac-
counts,386 and the hosting financial institution would pay interest on the 
funds stored in the wallet.387  Banks (and potentially other types of regulat-
ed financial institutions) could also compete to provide more innovative 
services using smart contracts that can be hosted on the ledger—these are 
contracts represented by machine-readable computer code that are self-
executing because they include “explicit transition rules for shifting the re-
lationship from one state to another, based on the realization of certain pre-
defined events.”388  In the future, such smart contracts may be able to facili-
tate context specific payments, like a “debit card for a child that could be 
used during lunch hours only in the ZIP code near the child’s school.”389  
Such smart contracts may also be able to profitably effect micropayments 
(payments of amounts under, say, 30 cents).  Currently, financial institu-
tions do not process micropayments because the cost of such processing of-
ten exceeds the amount of the payment itself.390  However, micropayments 
may become viable if distributed ledger and smart contract technology can 
significantly reduce transaction costs.391  Another area ripe for innovation is 
the provision of remittance services for workers sending funds home to 
their families who live abroad; institutions would be well-situated to pro-
vide these at a much lower cost if self-executing smart contracts were to be 
developed.392 
In 2014, New York’s then Superintendent of Financial Services Ben-
jamin Lawsky lambasted the financial industry for its lack of innovation in 
the payments space: “‘At a certain point, enough is enough,’  Lawsky said.  
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‘Four decades of slow-to-non-existent progress in the bank payments sys-
tem seem like fair warning.’”393  Lawsky went on to compare banks to 
Blockbuster, “which went bankrupt after it failed to innovate and was disin-
termediated by companies like Netflix,”394 but that comparison is not entire-
ly apt.  Unlike video rental stores, banks perform a quasi-public function in 
channeling funds to the broader economy, and so they are subjected to sig-
nificant levels of regulation (as well as receiving exclusive privileges like 
the right to accept deposits).395  This regulation serves as a barrier to entry, 
and has so far largely insulated the banking industry from disruptive forces.  
As Barclay’s former chief executive Antony Jenkins stated, the established 
banking industry has not yet felt the “full disruptive force of technolo-
gy”396—but this state of affairs may not persist for much longer. 
The buzzword “fintech” was ubiquitous in 2015–2016, and the term 
encompasses a variety of trends.397  It includes tech start-ups that, like 
Bitcoin, seek to exist entirely outside of—and perhaps displace—the regu-
lated financial sector.398  The term “fintech” also includes technology start-
ups seeking their own bank charter—this has been a relatively unpopular, 
but not unheard of, route because obtaining a bank charter and navigating 
the banking regulatory environment can be a difficult process.399  An alter-
native, more popular option for tech start-ups seeking to enter the payments 
space has been to collaborate with the regulated financial industry to enable 
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those start-ups to benefit from banks’ knowledge of existing payments sys-
tems and their surrounding regulatory environment.400 
At present, there is a significant amount of fintech collaboration with 
systemically important banks—Goldman Sachs, for example, “has been 
particularly active” in investing in tech start-ups,401 and Apple Pay,402 per-
haps the most visible payment innovation of recent years, was developed in 
conjunction with some of the largest banks, including JPMorgan, Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo, and Citigroup.403  These large financial institutions 
have the benefits of strong customer relationships and significant amounts 
of capital, which allow them the most room to innovate404 (they also have 
the capital to acquire start-ups that threaten to disrupt their business mod-
els).405  However, the profits generated by such innovation contribute to the 
incumbents’ increasing size, and the larger these institutions grow, the more 
their “too big to fail” status is cemented.406  Ideally, partnerships would in-
stead be forged between tech start-ups and smaller financial institutions (the 
latter of whom have been losing market share in recent years, in part be-
cause of an inability to keep up with the pace of technological change).407  
However, doing so will require these smaller banks to reconcile their more 
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conservative cultures with the pro-risk, “fail fast” approach of technological 
innovators.408 
There are a number of interesting initiatives afoot in this vein, and fur-
ther collaboration could be promoted by industry associations like the Inde-
pendent Community Bankers of America, or by financial regulators who 
could provide “public policy perspective and analytical support” for such 
endeavors.409  For example, Umpqua, an Oregon-based bank with $23 bil-
lion in assets, has launched a lab known as “Pivotus Ventures” in Silicon 
Valley, and is hoping that other smaller banks will pool resources with it to 
fund innovation and product testing with the aim of “explor[ing] the disrup-
tion in the industry and keep[ing] the bank relevant five to 10 years from 
now.”410  The Silicon Valley location was selected to help “recruit technol-
ogists in areas such as data analytics and user design from outside the fi-
nancial services industry.”411  Another small bank with cutting-edge tech-
nology is CBW Bank, a small community bank in Kansas that was 
purchased in 2009 by a couple with Silicon Valley and Wall Street creden-
tials.412  Since that time, the bank has developed services like instant pay-
ments within the United States, and “software that can judge the risk in-
volved in any transaction in real time.”413  CBW Bank has also 
implemented “distributed ledger technology developed by Ripple Labs to 
establish direct, bilateral relationships with foreign banks” to assist with in-
ternational transfers.414 
Ripple deserves special mention because, while it uses virtual currency 
technology that is not dissimilar to Bitcoin, Ripple seeks to partner with the 
traditional financial industry instead of eschewing it, explaining on its web-
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site how financial institutions can integrate the Ripple protocol into their 
payment services.415  While Ripple has issued a virtual currency known as 
XRP, it is more focused on using its technology to allow for payments gen-
erally than it is in promoting XRP as a stand-alone currency.416  Balances 
on the Ripple network can be held in USD, euro, yen, or bitcoins, amongst 
other things.417  Like Bitcoin, Ripple operates on a distributed ledger,418 but 
it diverges from Bitcoin in several important respects.  Most notably, in-
stead of having miners verify transactions (as Bitcoin does), Ripple uses a 
subset of validators from its network “chosen [by an algorithm] based on 
the expectation they will not collude in a coordinated effort to falsify data 
relayed to the network.”419  Therefore, “validating transactions does not in-
volve ‘proof-of-work’ that systems such as Bitcoin do,”420 and as a result, 
“[t]ransfers typically take 3-6 seconds and the process and fees are trans-
parent.”421 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Money is a social technology that can arise, even without institutional 
backing or legal imprimatur, to store value and effect exchanges.  However, 
while arguments have been made that privately issued money is just as 
good (if not better) than sovereign-issued money, at best this is only true 
when society as a whole has confidence in that privately issued money.  In-
stitutional support is needed to maintain ultimate trust in money in times of 
panic; it remains to be seen whether even the ECB can succeed in keeping 
the euro a trusted and stable currency without a single national government 
to stand behind it.  Whatever the outcome of the ongoing Eurozone crisis, it 
does not bode well for virtual currencies, which have neither a government 
nor a central bank to fill the void in times of panic.  Those who have her-
alded Bitcoin as the “destroyer of the dollar”422 are therefore too far-fetched 
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in their imaginings.  Instead, Bitcoin’s greatest contribution is its distributed 
ledger technology, but the benefits of that technology are best maximized 
by stripping it from Bitcoin.  A central bank-administered distributed ledg-
er, which processes payments denominated in sovereign currencies, could 
revolutionize the provision of payment services—without escalating sys-
temic risk within the financial system.  Ideally, outcompeted by the regulat-
ed banking industry, Bitcoin would “crash, but leave a lasting legacy.”423 
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